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REVIVING A NATURAL RIGHT: THE FREEDOM OF 
AUTONOMY 
MICHAEL ANTHONY LA WRENCE* 
America in the early twenty-first century is a place where oppres-
sive state constitutional amendments discriminate against millions 
of gay Americans; where compassionate end-of-life choice is ille-
gal in 49 states and where the one state where it is legal is being 
sued by the u.s. government; where hundreds of thousands are 
arrested yearly and tens of thousands are in prison for private 
possession or use of marijuana and the federal government suc-
cessfully sues to prevent a state from allowing the use of medical 
marijuana; where a woman's right to maintain control over her 
own reproductive decisions hangs by a thread; and where reli-
gious freedom is under relentless attack. 
Whatever became of the ideal that represented the very foundation 
of the Founders' and Framers' political theory - "free[ingJ the 
individual from the oppressive misuse of power, [and} from the 
tyranny of the state?" How can it be that Tocqueville's warning 
of a "wholly new species of oppression . .. [where} the democ-
ratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority . .. 
create[s} a society with a network of. .. [rules} that none can es-
cape, " has indeed come to pass in modern-day America? 
This article explores the historical foundations of the individual 
right of equality and free choice on matters of natural private con-
cern (collectively, "freedom of autonomy") in America, looks at 
severa/present-day applications, and concludes that meaningful 
steps must be taken - by encouraging greater awareness among 
lawmakers and courts of original meanings of the constitutional 
terms "liberty," property," "privileges," and "immunities," and 
perhaps even through constitutional amendment - to revive this 
most basic right from an overbearing government. Now is the 
time for change in America. 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. 
123 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We hold These Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 
Happiness. That to secure these Rights; Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to 
institute a new Government. 
-Declaration of Independence 
Something is wrong in twenty-first century America when it 
comes to recognizing certain "self-evident truths"l of freedom identi-
fied in its founding document nearly 23 decades ago. In particular, 
the United States today fails to embody the core principle of the Dec-
laration of Independence's core principles of equality and individual 
liberty? The quoted words from the Declaration represented more 
than just an idle, accidental well-turned phrase-as demonstrated by 
the historical record, they encompassed the very foundation of the 
Revolutionary political theory,3 and were intended to draw strict 
l. "We hold these truths to be self-evident .... " THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). Historian Leonard Levy writes, 
The pursuit of happiness, a phrase used by Locke for a concept that underlay his po-
litical ethics, subsumed the great rights of liberty and property, which were inextri-
cably related. Lockean thought, to which the Framers subscribed, included within 
the pursuit of happiness that which delighted and contented the mind and a belief 
that indispensable to it were good health, reputation, and knowledge. There was 
nothing radical in the idea of the right to the pursuit of happiness. The anti-
American Tory Dr. Samuel Johnson had used the phrase, and Sir William Black-
stone, also a Tory, employed a close equivalent in his Commentaries in 1765 when 
remarking "that man should pursue his own happiness. This is the foundation of 
what we call ethics, or natural law." 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 251-52 (Yale University Press 1999). 
3. Levy writes: 
According to American revolutionary theory ... natural rights ... were possessed 
by individuals in the state of nature, which existed before people voluntarily con-
tracted with each other to establish a government whose purpose was to secure their 
rights. In the state of nature, when only the law of nature governed, the theory pos-
ited that-as the first section of the Virginia Declaration of Rights stated-"all men 
are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of 
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive 
or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of 
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
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boundaries for the proper reach of government. The radical nature of 
this statement lies in the fact that no political regime ever before had 
so clearly and openly placed individual liberties beyond the reach of 
government. 
We have come a long way in America since the founding, but in 
the modern era we have come in precisely the wrong direction in hon-
oring the sort of rich individual liberties of equality and of free choice 
on matters of natural private concern (call it collectively "freedom of 
autonomy,,)4 demanded in the Declaration of Independence and me-
morialized in the Constitution.5 Although progress has been made to 
LEVY, supra note 2, at 15-16. "Madison, presenting his proposed [Bill of Rights], spoke of 
'the perfect equality of mankind. ", [d. at 254. 
4. The term "freedom of autonomy" is derived in part from the Supreme Court's recent 
Lawrence v. Texas decision striking down a state law punishing certain intimate sexual con-
duct in the home. Writing for the Court in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy announced, "Liberty 
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private 
places. . .. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self 
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added). In substance, the term "freedom of 
autonomy" encompasses, but is not completed by, the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amend-
ment privacy and equal protection doctrines, and is used to allow a fresh look at, and revival 
of, the thinking that existed during the Revolutionary era of a comprehensive, broad-based in-
dividual freedom in which government is strictly subordinate to the individual and acts legiti-
mately only insofar as it protects individual liberty and equality on matters of natural private 
concern, and to urge a repudiation of the current conventional thinking in which government 
predominates at the expense of the individual and parses out recognition of individual liberty 
rights like so many sugar cubes to a cooperative pony. 
5. Levy writes: 
In the minds of the Framers, many provisions of the Constitution had a libertarian 
character [of limiting government to promote individual liberty). . .. During the 
controversy over ratification of the Constitution, when the omission of a bill of 
rights was a major issue, many Framers argued, as did Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist, No. 84, "that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to 
every useful purpose, a Bill of Rights" .... The overwhelming majority of the Con-
vention believed ... that a bill of rights "is unnecessary." 
LEVY, supra note 2, at 17-19. In creating a new national government with strictly enumerated 
limited powers, the Framers could not conceive of the government infringing on rights. 
While a new national power system emerged from [the Constitutional ratification] 
struggle, it does not mark a sudden break in the ideological history or our national 
origins. [Rather, t ]he essential spirit of eighteenth century reform-its idealism, its 
determination to free the individual from the power of the state, even a reformed 
state-lived on, and lives on still. 
BERNARD BAIL YN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION viii (En I. ed 
1992 (1967» (winner of Bancroft and Pulitzer Prizes). Similarly, 
[t]o argue that the Framers had used natural rights as a means of escaping obliga-
tions of obedience to the king [Declaration] but did not use natural rights "as a 
source for rules of decision" [Constitution] is hogwash. One has only to read the 
state recommendations for a bill of rights to know that the natural rights philosophy 
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correct some government practices fundamentally inconsistent with 
the Declaration's exhortations6 (slavery was abolished; blacks, 
women and non-propertied men got the vote; and some (but only 
some) of the inequities experienced by Native Americans have been 
addressed), the unfortunate fact remains in the early twenty-first cen-
tury that-politicians' and others' routine proclamations to the con-
trary-America, the "Land of the Free" immortalized in story and 
song, is assuredly no longer "the freest nation on Earth.,,7 
One need look no further than the election of 2004, when state 
constitutional amendments dramatically restricting the liberties of 
millions of Americans were passed in all thirteen states where they 
were on the ballot8- blatant discrimination disguised under the good 
name of democracy-to get an idea how widespread is the larceny. 
America is losing ground-is backtracking-on matters of freedom of 
seized the minds of the Framers as it had the minds of the rebellious patriots of 
1776. 
LEVY, supra note 2, at 255. 
6. Even in the beginning the statement that "all men are created equal" was hypocritical 
in the extreme, in light of the facts that: In 1776 slavery was legal-and would continue to be 
legal for many more decades; that many adults, including women-fully half of the adult 
population--<:ould not vote; and that Native Americans had only begun to be systematically 
deprived of their rights. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 124-25 (Yale University Press 2001). 
7. Other governments such as The Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, to name just a 
few, have surpassed the United States in their tolerance of individual freedom of autonomy. 
Those who cling to the myth of America as the preeminent keeper of the flame of freedom 
point mainly to two aspects of the U.S. Constitution. One, the guaranty of a republican form 
of government requiring representatives to face reelection every few years U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 4; and two, the Bill of Rights' and Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees that certain indi-
vidual freedoms are beyond the government's reach. As for the first, free democratic elections 
do not a free nation make. Representatives democratically elected by majorities are all-too-
capable of systematically oppressing a vast assortment of minority freedoms, and they do so 
all the time right here in America. 
On the second, there's no question the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment have been 
instrumental in protecting individual liberties. The problem is that the guarantees are unevenly 
applied, in part because the provisions are not explicit in the liberties that they are meant to 
protect (ambiguity largely by design, of course, to allow future generations some degree of 
interpretive flexibility to respond to changing times); but also in large part because the U.S. 
Supreme Court over time has been remarkably unfriendly to the notion of protecting liberty 
and equality. See generally, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2; AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(Yale University Press 1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Duke University Press 1986). 
8. The amendments were ostensibly to ban same-sex marriage, but in fact their intent and 
scope are far broader than that in curbing the rights of gay Americans. In Michigan, to offer 
just one example (this is happening in others of the thirteen states as well), the state's Attorney 
General recently issued an opinion that state actors could no longer extend benefits to same-
sex couples. See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. (forthcoming April 2006). 
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autonomy. Today, more than ever, majorities in America are allowed 
to steal from minorities inherent natural rights of individual autonomy 
and to impose upon others their own chosen brands of morality and 
values.9 
Moreover, even in the areas where America historically has led 
the way for other nations-protecting religious plurality, for example, 
as practiced in the pre-Revolutionary colonies lo and guaranteed by the 
Establishment Clause requirement that the government shall not favor 
one religion over another (or, for that matter, religion in general over 
non-religion) and the free exercise clausell-Americans' basic free-
doms are suffering a slow but steady death by a thousand cutS. 12 
Who can remember the last time Congress took a principled 
though unpopular stand for individual freedom of autonomy? In the 
United States Congress of the twenty-first century, the Senate votes 
99-0 to condemn a U.S. Court of Appeals decision protecting an athe-
ist's right to have his daughter educated free of government coercion 
to pledge allegiance to one Nation "under God,,,13 and both houses 
9 .. Cartoon philosopher Theodore Dreisel (Dr. Seuss) captures this behavior: 
Out west, near Hawtch-Hawtch, there's a Hawtch-Hawtcher Bee-Watcher. His job 
is to watch. .. is to keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee. A bee that is watched 
will work harder, you see. Well ... he watched and he watched. But, in spite of his 
watch, that bee didn't work any harder. Not mawtch. So then somebody said, "our 
old bee-watching man just isn't bee-watching as hard as he can. He ought to be 
watched by another Hawtch-Hawtcher! The thing that we need is a Bee-Watcher-
Watcher!" WELL. ... 
The Bee-Watcher-Watcher watched the Bee-Watcher. He didn't watch well. So 
another Hawtch-Hawtcher had to come in as a Watch-Watcher-Watcher! And today 
all the Hawtchers who live in Hawtch-Hawtch are watching on Watch-Watcher-
Watchering-Watch, Watch-Watching the Watcher who's watching that bee. You're 
not a Hawtch-Watcher. You're lucky, you see! 
DR. SEUSS, DID I EVER TELL YOU How LUCKY YOU ARE? 26-29 (Random House 1973). 
10. LEVY, supra note 2, at 6 (writing that "Maryland's Toleration Act of 1649 was far 
more liberal than England's Toleration Act forty years later ... [and] was the first to use the 
phrase 'the free exercise of religion,' later embodied in the First Amendment. The act also 
symbolized the extraordinary fact that for most of the seventeenth century in Maryland, Catho-
lics and Protestants openly worshiped as they chose and lived in peace, if not amity .. " [T]he 
Charter of Rhode Island ... made the guarantee of religious liberty a part of the fundamental 
law.") At the time of the founding, "nowhere did freedom of religion prosper as it did in 
America." Id. at 3. 
II. U.S. Const. amend. l. 
12. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. 
13. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Pledge Ruling Fails to Guard Religious Freedom, 
THE DETROIT NEWS, June 16, 2004, at AI3 (stating, "By failing to make a statement on the 
issue [of the inclusion of the words '''under God'" in the pledge of allegiance], the court failed 
to protect the rights of we the people to be free from a government that would presume to tell 
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pass legislation (eagerly signed by the president) attempting through 
procedural maneuvering to prevent a woman in a persistent vegetative 
state from exercising her right to be free of unwanted medical treat-
ment and remove feeding tubes, even though state courts had deter-
mined repeatedly by the evidentiary standard required by state law 
(clear and convincing evidence), that she would wish not to be main-
tained in that condition. 14 
The sorts of positions being taken by Congress and the president 
in these and other cases 15 would have been unthinkable through the 
early years of the nation's history. The most basic concept among the 
founding generation for what this new nation "America" was to stand 
for was the lofty principle that government of any sortl6 simply lacks 
the authority-legal, moral, or otherwise-to interfere with individual 
liberty on matters of natural private concern. This principle was im-
portant enough over which to fight a war of independence, and is 
memorialized in word and spirit in the Declaration of Independence 
and Constitution. It was a major theme of the Reconstruction which 
brought wayward states into the fold of respecting individual liberty. 
The preeminence of the concept was recognized by Justice Louis 
us whether and how we should practice our faith or religion."). 
14. See Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Congress Passes and Bush Signs Schiavo 
Measure, NY TIMES, March 21, 2005, at AI; Michael Anthony Lawrence, Actions Show Con-
gress' Total Disregard for a Citizen's "Right to be Left Alone," DETROIT FREE PRESS, March 
22,2005. Congress's action in this case was inappropriate on multiple levels. Indeed, the cur-
rent House majority leader Tom DeLay epitomizes the constitutionally clueless attitude held 
by the United States Congress in his comment responding to the federal courts' declining to 
take up Congress's cause in this case: "[These judges] thumbed their nose at Congress and the 
president .... [T]he time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behav-
ior, but not today." Editorial, Judges under Attack, INTERNATIONAL HERALD-TRIBUNE, April 
6, 2005, at 8. As noted by the editors, 
Jd 
Coming so close to the fatal shooting of one judge in his courtroom and the killing 
of two family members of another, those words were at best an appalling example 
of irresponsibility in pursuit of political gain. But they were not an angry, off-the-
cuff reaction. . .. Republicans in Congress and the Bush administration, unhappy 
with some of the rulings of the judiciary, are trying to write it out of its constitu-
tional role .... [I]fCongress succeeds in curtailing the judiciary'S ability to act as a 
check on the other two branches, the United States will be far less free. 
15. The PATRIOT Act of2001 itself is worthy of volumes of discussion on its abridge-
ment of civil liberties and, for our purposes, freedom of autonomy. Pub. L. No. 108-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
16. "The dominant theory in the United States from the time of the Revolution was that 
the fundamental law limited all branches of the goverrunent, not just the crown as in England, 
where the great liberty documents did not limit the legislative power." LEVY, supra note 2, at 
24. 
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Brandeis when he stated famously in 1928, "The makers of our Con-
stitution ... conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.,,17 
Given the bleak present picture, what does the future hold for the 
cause of freedom of autonomy in America? Do the results of the 
2004 election, as only the most recent example of the atrocities being 
committed against the cause of individual freedom, suggest that it is 
too late? Is America incorrigible when it comes to making a real 
commitment to freedom of autonomy-that is, to respecting the right 
of other people to do what they will even if it horrifies or repulses 
US?18 
17. Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The quote, 
in full, states: 
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope. The mak-
ers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feel-
ings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis-
factions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans 
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, 
as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjus-
tifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the 
means employed, must be deemed a violation. 
!d. at 478. As a reminder to Congress, the President, and all other federal, state and local gov-
ernment officials of the axiom that government acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the 
individual's "right to be let alone," Justice Brandeis' "right to be let alone" opinion should be 
framed and placed in every federal and state building in the land-perhaps in place of the Ten 
Commandments. 
18. Is there an alternative to a world where groups of individuals and governments "pro-
claim, in a variety of accents: "We are the Chosen Ones, let the rest of humanity go to hell?" 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 23 (Yale University Press 1992) 
[hereinafter LIBERAL REVOLUTION]' Yes. On toleration, it is helpful to look at things from a 
deontological point of view. Individuals and government alike (government is, after all, com-
posed of individual people) presumably would be more tolerant in their behaviors and policies 
if operating under a semblance of the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," where we imagine our-
selves ignorant of particular facts "such as [our] race, gender, intelligence, disabilities or lack 
of them, [our] particular life plan and proclivities, and all other particular facts about [our] as-
pirations and circumstances. . .. It is like being asked to agree on the rules for playing a game 
before you know whether they will work to your advantage, or a congressman being bound in 
advance by the findings of a military base-closing commission before knowing whether the 
commission will recommend closing the base in his district." IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL 
FOUNDATION OF POLITICS 116 (Yale University Press 2003) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 113 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (1971)). The idea is rather 
like the old kindergarten maxim to "treat others as you would like to be treated yourself." In a 
similar vein, Bruce Ackerman asks us to consider a flesh and blood "stranger": 
Strangers may live next door, but they are not like us. They are doing odd things at 
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From an institutional sense certainly it is not too late-America 
has the governmental structure, with the Constitution, to effect major 
change. And certainly America has the legacy of freedom-the stal-
wart individuals of the Revolutionary era and Reconstruction had it 
within themselves to stand firmly on principles of individual liberty 
and equality. Whether Americans in the twenty-first century have the 
will to fight the good fight is a much more uncertain question. A 
good many Americans have proven themselves to be remarkably in-
tolerant on matters involving individual freedom of autonomy-and 
the necessary changes are going to require a lot of goodwill and toler-
ance on the part of many millions of people. 
Truth be told, America's current struggles are not unanticipated. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, while predicting the inevitability of democ-
racy's appeal worldwide in stating, "The gradual development of the 
equality of conditions is ... a providential fact, and it possesses all 
the characteristics of a Divine decree: it is universal, it is durable, it 
constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as 
men contribute to its progress,,,19 wasn't so sanguine about the long-
term effects of democratic political equality on individuals: 
[A] wholly new species of oppression will arise. Among citizens 
equal and alike, the supreme power, the democratic government, 
acting in response to the will of the majority, will create a society 
with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, 
that none can escape. [Sound familiar?] Ultimately, then, the citi-
zens of a democratic country will be reduced to nothing better than 
a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government 
is the shepherd.2o 
odd times for reasons that disturb us in basic ways. How to respond to this unease? 
By loving the strangers as ourselves? Only a god could do this: there are too many 
strangers with too many strangenesses. . .. You and I may remain strangers, but we 
may find cornmon ground in a politics that protects our equal right to cultivate our 
distinctive characters without anyone stranger calling the shots. . .. If we do this, 
we may be something more than strangers, if less than friends. . . . However odd or 
perverse our beliefs may seem to one another, perhaps we can find cornmon ground 
in recognizing this: you and I are both struggling to find meaning in the world. 
ACKERMAN, supra at 18. 
19. DAHL, supra note 6, at 126 (quoting I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA. Ixxxi (Henry Reeve, trans., Schocken Books 1961). 
20. DAHL, supra note 6, at 133 (paraphrasing closely Tocqueville, supra note 19, at I: 
298, 304, and 2: 380-81). Before Tocqueville, Benjamin Franklin had similar concerns, com-
menting upon the finished Constitution to the Constitutional Convention (to which he was not 
a delegate, serving during that time in France) in 1787: 
I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such: because I think a Gen-
eral Government necessary for us, and there is no Form of Government but what 
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Tocqueville's prediction provokes a spirited rebuttal from mod-
ern defenders of democracy like Ronald Dahl, who states, 
[I]f we read the passages as a forecast of the way in which democ-
ratic countries would tend to evolve, 1 think we are bound to con-
clude that Tocqueville was just dead wrong. When we examine 
the course of democratic development over the past two centuries, 
and particularly over the century just ended, what we find is a pat-
tern of democratic development that stands in total contradiction to 
such a prediction. We find instead that as democratic institutions 
become more deeply rooted il1 a country, so do fundamental politi-
cal rights, liberties, and opportunities. As a democratic govern-
ment matures in a country, the likelihood that it will give way to 
h ... h 21 an aut ontanan regIme approac es zero. 
To the extent Tocqueville's passage is read as predicting that democ-
racy leads inevitably to authoritarian government, Dahl undoubtedly 
is correct-history has shown, at least to date, that mature democratic 
regimes do not give rise to authoritarianism. Indeed, democracy is 
the best political alternative so far devised for protecting individual 
libertl2-post-Enlightenment23 or otherwise. But given its more 
may be a Blessing to the People if well-administered; and I believe farther that this 
is likely to well administered for a Course of Years and can only end in Despotism 
as other Forms have done before it, when the People shall become so corrupted as to 
need Despotic Government, being incapable of any other. 
GORE VIDAL, INVENTING A NATION: WASHINGTON, ADAMS, JEFFERSON 30-31 (Yale Univer-
sity Press 2003). Gore Vidal, the popular author and commentator on American life, offers the 
following observation: "Now, two centuries and sixteen years later, Franklin's blunt dark 
prophecy has come true: popular corruption has indeed given birth to that Despotic Govern-
ment which he foresaw as inevitable at our birth." Id. at 31. 
21. DAHL, supra note 6, at 134. Dahl adds, "Democracy can, as we all know, collapse 
into dictatorship. But breakdowns are extraordinarily rare in mature democracies. . .. Even 
mature democratic countries have had to face wars, economic depression, large-scale unem-
ployment, terrorism, and other challenges. But they did not collapse into authoritarian re-
gimes." Id. 
22. SHAPIRO, supra note l~, at 226. "The historical record reveals that democracies are 
better respecters of individual rights and civil liberties than nondemocracies." Moreover, "the 
democratic tradition also does comparatively well when considered alongside" other post-
Enlightenment intellectual political traditions like classical utilitarianism, social contract the-
ory, Marxism, and anti-Enlightenment theory. Id. at 227. Specifically: 
[c]lassical utilitarianism ... [is] indifferent to individual rights, rendering it vulner-
able to Rawls's critique that it fails to take seriously the differences among persons. 
Neoclassical utilitarianism avoids this charge, but at the price of taking on new dif-
ficulties with respect to individual rights. In some formulations it operates with so 
robust a libertarian conception of individual autonomy that it violates the rights of 
others once unintended harms and the broader context of resources is taken into ac-
count. . .. The Marxist tradition oscillates between an implausible utopian ideal, 
according to which the need for rights would be rendered obsolete with the abolition 
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natural reading, the passage describes not so much the transformation 
of government into an authoritarian regime as it does the subtle 
changes likely to occur after decades and centuries of "majority tyr-
anny,,24 in a democracy. What is the nature of this change? Answer: 
entrenched bureaucracy, government sclerosis created by generations 
of majorities seeking to solidify and perpetuate their legacy by institu-
tionalizing their policies through picayune rules and regulations that 
reach into virtually every comer of life-rules and regulations which 
by their very nature cannot help but infringe on individual liberties 
including, for purposes of this essay, the individual freedom of auton-
of injustice, and a strong version of Locke's workmanship ideal. . .. Certainly the 
record of nondemocratic socialist and communist states that have existed in the 
world is scarcely encouraging [on the matter of protecting individual 
rights]. ... The anti-Enlightenment move is profoundly unsatisfactory with respect 
to individual rights. Burke's argument is a caution against making things worse by 
trying to make them better, and he reasonably reminds us that changing our political 
institutions has an inescapable dimension of rebuilding a ship at sea. Well taken as 
his admonitions against vanguardism undoubtedly are, ships sometimes rot and de-
cay, and they can sometimes be improved upon .... [V]arious postmodem and 
communitarian schools of thought ... may often leave objectionable practices un-
scathed. . .. In contrast, the democratic approach creates an impetus to reform in-
herited practices as they are reproduced into the future .... [and] offers fruitful re-
sources to manage the potential tensions between the Enlightenment commitments 
to the pursuit of truth through science and the centrality of individual rights .... 
Both values are better served by the structured instability of power relations that 
proponents of democracy seek to institutionalize. Democracy is a system in which 
those who are disadvantaged by present arrangements have both the incentive and 
the resources to point to the defects of those arrangements, show how the truth 
about them is being obscured, and try to get those arrangements changed. . .. It is, 
however, better thought of as essential medicine for a chronic malady than as a cure 
that will ever render the treatment redundant. 
Id. at 227-30. 
23. The Enlightenment's attention to individual rights: 
[D]ifferentiates its political philosophy from the ancient and medieval commitments 
to order and hierarchy. This focus brings the freedom of the individual to the center 
of arguments about politics. This move was signaled in the natural law tradition by 
a shift in emphasis from the logic of law to the idea of natural right. 
SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 14. Along with its commitment to individual rights, the Enlight-
enment is characterized by a preoccupation with science. Id. at 224 (noting that the concerns 
of science and individual rights "enjoy a lineage that predates the Enlightenment"). 
24. James Madison was keenly aware of the threat that majorities pose to individual lib-
erties, stating that: 
the Bill of Rights ... [should] limit the powers of government, thus preventing leg-
islative as well as executive abuse, and above all preventing abuses of power by 
"the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority." Mere "pa-
per barriers" might fail, but they raised a standard that might educate the majority 
against acts to which they might be inclined. 
LEVY, supra note 2, at 35. 
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omy. 
And so it is today. Tocqueville's blunt, remarkably prescient 
prediction for the mature democracy is an all-too-accurate description 
of life in twenty-first century America. While it doesn't contribute to 
a positive self image to consider oneself as part of a flock of timid 
animals (even if industrious) beholden to its government shepherd, 
the description rings uncomfortably true. On a more optimistic note, 
perhaps some among the flock, if given a ray of hope, would enthusi-
astically agree that the shepherd needs to be re-directed, if not given 
the crook altogether. 
Look again to the inspirational words of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, not just as lofty and unattainable rhetoric, but as a realis-
tic-though highly elusive-goal. From the beginning, our forebears 
knew it would not be easy to "secure these Rights .... [of] Life, Lib-
erty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.,,25 When freedom was on the line, 
"the colonists knew .... [w ]hat would in fact happen in England and 
America would be the result .... of the degree of vigilance and the 
strength of purpose the people could exert. For they believed 
... [t]he preservation of liberty would continue to be what it had been 
in the past, a bitter struggle with adversity .... ,,26 
The preservation of liberty continues to be yet today what it has 
been in the past-a bitter struggle with adversity. Only time will tell 
how the next stage in freedom's evolution (or revolution) plays out in 
America-and whether modem-day Americans have the guts to make 
the necessary changes to ensure liberty, or instead demonstrate them-
selves to be mere sheep unworthy of their ancestors' stalwart legacy. 
As a preliminary matter, the arguments advanced in this essay 
might be described at various points, depending on the taxonomy du 
J'our 27 as "rights foundationalist ,,28 "liberal ,,29 "liberal republican ,,30 , " , 
25. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
26. BAILYN, supra note 5, at 85. 
27. Labels, as academics know, can be useful in organizing taxonomies, although they 
can also be limiting. We've become so committed to roles and labels-and so polarized-in 
America that we think the roles and labels define us. In the end, it's not the labels-it's the 
substance behind them-that counts. 
28. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-16 (The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press 1991) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS] (contrasting "monist" argu-
ments (favoring democratic processes over rights theory) with "foundationalist" arguments 
(those favoring rights theory over democratic processes), and proposing a middle ("dualist") 
ground). 
29. See infra notes 66, 70-73 and accompanying text. 
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"Lockean,,,31 "Jeffersonian,,,32 "constititutionalist,,,33 "civil libertar-
30. The arguments line up, at least partially, with Ackerman's description, writing: 
[t]his kind of liberalism [liberal republicanism], does not look upon people as ab-
stract individuals, divorced from their social contexts, nor does it embrace the no-
tion of "natural rights" to property and contract. . .. It insists that the foundation of 
personal liberty is a certain kind of political life-one requiring the ongoing exer-
tions of a special kind of citizenry. Rather than grounding personal freedom on 
some putatively prepolitical "state of nature," this kind of liberalism makes the cul-
tivation of liberal citizenship central to its enterprise. 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 28, at 30. Agreed--except there are some rights that 
are special, that are grounded in a "prepolitical 'state of nature': "privacy" rights, for exam-
ple, some (but not all) of the rights embraced within the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, and right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment assuredly are 
not subject to "ongoing exertions ... of citizenry." !d. They are unalienable natural rights, 
beyond any actions of the citizenry-nothing the citizenry does or says should be able to alter 
them. Freedom of autonomy is likewise this sort of absolute natural right. 
As outlined by Bernard Bailyn and Leonard Levy in their exhaustive works on the literature of 
the Revolutionary era, there is an overwhelming abundance of material supporting the point 
that the post-Revolutionary era did not abandon outright their core belief that certain aspects of 
individual liberty are beyond the reach of government-state or federal. See BAIL YN, supra 
note 5; LEVY, supra note 2. 
31. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 5; SHAPIRO, supra note 18. John Locke's theories 
formed the basis for much of the Revolutionary era's political theory, espoused once again 
herein. But this essay does not go all the way to the sort of classic liberal: 
"Lockean consensus" which trivialize[s] politics and glorifie[s] the natural rights of 
isolated individuals to life, liberty, and the pursuit of property (or is it happi-
ness?) ... look[ s] upon the state as an unmitigated threat to natural liberty ... [be-
lieves that t]he government that governs best governs least ... [or the Marxist tum 
that] the only "really important" use of state power is to serve as a revolutionary 
mechanism for the long march from feudalism to capitalism to socialism. 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 28, at 25-26. This essay instead takes the position 
that effective government plays a vital role in several areas, not the least of which in protecting 
individual rights like freedom of autonomy. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
32. The ideal of liberty and individual freedom of autonomy permeate Jefferson's politi-
cal philosophy. 
33. Bruce Ackerman poses an interesting two-stage hypothetical: First, what should be 
the approach of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court if confronted with a case chal-
lenging a validly ratified constitutional amendment establishing Christianity "as the state relig-
ion of the American people, and [forbidding] the public worship of other gods?" Should the 
Justice hold that the amendment is somehow an unconstitutional violation of rights because it 
acts to repeal the First Amendment's Establishment Clause? The answer is "no"-fidelity to 
the constitutional process requires that we accept the Constitution's primacy, for better or 
worse-and an amendment properly proposed and ratified through the Article V process is the 
highest law of the land which the judiciary must respect. The proper responses for dissenters 
to such an amendment would be to: (a) work within the system to try to repeal the amendment 
through the Article V process; or (b) separate/secede. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 28, at 14-16. 
Second, would it be constitutionally appropriate for the Court to invalidate another validly-
ratified amendment stating: "Any American advocating the repeal of [the previous Christianity 
Amendment] is hereby declared guilty of treason and subject to capital punishment upon con-
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ian ,,34 "libertarian social democratic ,,35 "radical" and/or "revolution-
, " 
ary,,,36-but will settle just for "thought-provoking." 
Section II explores progressively the nature of the right of free-
dom of autonomy, several present-day applications, and the right's 
historical foundations, and concludes that meaningful steps must be 
taken to explore and utilize constitutional mechanisms that would as-
sist in reviving this natural right of individual freedom of autonomy 
on matters of natural private concern as it was envisioned at the time 
of America's founding and reaffirmed during Reconstruction. Such 
mechanisms may include, for example, greater judicial respect for the 
concepts of individual "liberty" and "property" as those terms were 
originally understood in the Constitution (a greater respect that was, 
in fact, accorded in the Court's 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision -
there is hope )/7 a continuing judicial reinvigoration of the Fourteenth 
Amendment privileges or immunities clause to its originally intended 
role/8 or best of all (though highly improbable), through constitu-
tional amendment.39 The essay closes by asserting that a greater 
viction," on the reasoning that it unconstitutionally entrenches the amendment against any sub-
sequent reconsideration by the People under Article V? The committed constitutionalist's an-
swer is again "no" (although it's tempting to say, like Ackerman, that "such questions are best 
left to the dark day they arise")-those proposing and ratifying the amendment did so with full 
knowledge that the amendment would remove the question from any possible further consid-
eration, and they were even still able to mobilize the support specified by Article V to prevail. 
The constitutional process should be respected. So what is a "liberal," "rights foundationalist," 
"revolutionary" to do? Answer: As Ackerman says, it might "simply be best for all decent 
people to quit the regime and struggle to overthrow it[.]" Id. at 16. Agreed-at least with re-
spect to the "quit the regime" part, but perhaps without the "struggle to overthrow it" part; 
rather, the decent people should seek to separate/secede/divide peacefully without starting a 
bloody Civil War. 
34. The underlying premise of freedom of autonomy is the protection of civil liberty. 
35. See infra notes 44, 45. 
36. Rights must be protected from majority tyranny through judicial review, and when 
judicial review is inadequate, through constitutional amendment, and when constitutional 
amendment is inadequate or impractical, either through stronger conceptions of state inde-
pendence or perhaps even-if oppression is systematic, persistent, and long-lasting enough-
through separation or secession. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 28, at 16. 
37. See supra note 5; infra note 95. 
38. See MICHAEL ANTHONY LAWRENCE, SECOND AMENDMENT INCORPORATION 
THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE (forthcoming 2005). 
39. A constitutional amendment would be the ideal mechanism for reviving the natural 
right of individual freedom of autonomy, since an amendment would give the clearest possible 
guidance to government on the scope of the right, but ... one must concede that this is little 
more than a pipe dream. Mobilizing a citizenry to amend the Constitution is no small feat-
the Constitution has only been amended 18 times over the course of215-plus years. And let's 
not fool ourselves. It would be especially difficult to spur Congress to action today, when it is 
so ideologically polarized, to discuss seriously (much less propose) an amendment that would 
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awareness and vigilance by We the People of the natural origins and 
history of the freedom of autonomy in the founding era is vital if we 
are to revive this once-prized natural right to a position of prominence 
in twenty-first century America. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF AUTONOMY 
The premise of this thought-piece is that government in America 
has fallen far short of the promises made in the Declaration and Bill 
of Rights, as reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, for protecting 
individual liberties of equality and free choice on matters of natural 
private concern (collectively "freedom of autonomy")-rights consid-
ered throughout the Revolutionary years and at least into the early 
years of the United States to be natural and virtually inviolable.40 
The individual right of freedom of autonomy exists in a pre-
political state of nature, having been granted by one's own Creator, 
before and notwithstanding any attempted interference by false gov-
ernment gods. People individually or collectively may choose to cede 
their own freedom of autonomy (that too is part of the freedom), but 
under no circumstances may one person or group of persons (e.g., 
government) make that decision for another or others against their 
will. Stated another way, nothing-no person, no government--can 
take away, against one's will, one's God-given freedom of auton-
omy.41 People individually or collectively may decide to condition 
effectively curtail government's ability to regulate on matters involving individual choice and 
morality-precisely the matters that many representatives' constituents, after all, voted them 
into office to regulate in the first place. As for mobilizing a majority of states to call for a con-
stitutional convention, the other manner of proposing an amendment under the Article V proc-
ess, well ... even beyond the fact that no amendment has ever been proposed in this manner, 
one must be skeptical if it could happen for the first time in this instance, given the results of 
the 2004 election where state constitutional amendments limiting the individual freedom of 
autonomy of a certain class of people were passed in all eleven states where they were on the 
ballot. Finally, even if the amendment were somehow miraculously ratified, there is no guar-
antee the Supreme Court would give it effect. Its recent decision in Lawrence notwithstand-
ing, see infra note 91, the Court over time has not been especially friendly to liberty-after all, 
see what it did to the privileges or immunities clause in the Slaughter-House Cases. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE, supra note 38. 
40. Above all, the Revolutionary ideology "was dominated by a ... cluster of convictions 
focused on the effort to free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, from the tyr-
anny of the state." BAILYN, supra note 5 at v-vi. See also infra notes 80-82 and accompany-
ing text. 
41. Alexander Hamilton commented that "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be 
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, 
in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself, and can never be 
erased or obscured by mortal power." LEVY, supra, note 2 at 250 (quoting Alexander Hamil-
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their right of freedom of autonomy, as they do when they consent to 
be governed, in return for certain benefits from the government. To 
the extent such consent is even possible,42 the underlying agreement 
memorializing the consent between We the People and the govern-
ment in America-the Constitution-requires that the government 
must protect our freedom of autonomy from overbearing government 
and marauding majorities. 
Lest one form a mistaken first impression about the broader im-
plications of this "freedom of autonomy as natural right" position, it 
assuredly does not disparage public service43 or advocate a strict lib-
ertarian approach that government should have little or no role in all 
matters;44 rather, it suggests that government has an important role,45 
ton). Another tough-minded American materialist had led the way to such thinking. John 
Dickinson, speaking of "the rights essential to happiness," rhapsodized: "We claim them from 
a higher source - from the King of kings, and lord of all the earth. They are not annexed to us 
by parchment and seals. They are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish 
the laws of our nature. They are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us by 
any human power without taking our lives." ld. (quoting John Dickinson). Hence comments 
like Patrick Henry's to "give me liberty or give me death." Patrick Henry, "Give Me Liberty or 
Give Me Death." MOSES COlT TYLER, AMERICAN STATEMEN: PATRICK HENRY, 145 (John T 
Morse, Jr. ed., Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1887) (1775). ("In short, [these rights] are founded on 
the immutable maxims of reason and justice. Such opinions were commonplace." LEVY, su-
pra note 2, at 250 (emphasis added)). "So, too, the directly related views expressed by Jeffer-
son in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence reflected commonly held principles. 
In 1822 John Adams, who had been a member of the committee of Congress that Jefferson had 
chaired in 1776, observed that there was 'not an idea in it [the Declaration] but what had been 
hackneyed.' Jefferson asserted that 'all American whigs thought alike' on those matters. The 
purpose of the Declaration, he wrote, was not 'to find out new principles, or new argu-
ments ... but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject. ", LEVY, supra note 
2, at 250-51 (quoting John Adams). 
42. See generally, RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 32-52 
(Princeton University Press 2004). 
43. Under this approach, civic republicanism-the participation of an informed, educated 
populace in the life of the community-is a virtue. 
44. We know too well from experience that human beings left entirely to their own de-
vices are capable of oppression and unspeakable cruelty in the name of God, country, or mo-
rality. Paraphrasing the old maxim, those who fail to remember the mistakes of history are 
bound to repeat them. Idealism or utopianism or nihilism aside, some form of government is 
necessary-people simply incapable of leaving each other alone. 
45. Consistent with the freedom of autonomy position, a fair system of taxation is neces-
sary to support responsible government spending in aiding education, supporting scientific 
research, providing healthcare for all citizens, administering social security, guaranteeing un-
employment benefits, building a strong defense (individual liberty is preserved only so long as 
the nation is safe from its enemies), and last but not least, providing prompt relief in times of 
national emergency (a task at which the American federal government demonstrated itself to 
be woefully inadequate in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in September 2005 in Louisiana and 
Mississippi). "This conception of governmental power is broad enough to embrace any con-
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but acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the individual's "right 
to be let alone" as it does so. All government activity must be meas-
ured by this test: if the government's action abridges an individual's 
freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern, presump-
tively it is not legitimate.46 
To begin, as a matter of methodology, how does one determine 
(1) what rights are sufficiently "natural" or "fundamental" as to merit 
protection from government interference; and (2) under what circum-
stances, if ever, can government abridge a fundamental or natural 
ception of the state, from a minimalist, night-watchman state to the contemporary European-
style social welfare state. Whatever version of the state a society chooses to adopt, a govern-
ment must exist and must possess certain powers that enable the polity collectively to achieve 
the goals that it sets for itself," James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to 
National Power: Toward a Functional Theory a/State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, lOll 
(2003), while at the same time instituting mechanisms to prevent the state from infringing the 
personal liberties of the polity. The freedom of autonomy position supports the operation of 
free markets, but also recognizes the important role that government must play to assure a fair 
game. In its efforts to provide equal economic opportunity, government must not dampen in-
dividual initiative or remove legitimate private incentive. If a twenty-first century perspective 
of the communist experiment-with the implosion and utter failure of the Soviet system, to-
gether with the capitalist-in-fact activities of the Chinese-tells us anything, it is that the pros-
pect of private gain is a powerful incentive for enterprise and improved individual economic 
prospects. There are natural consequences of the market, with winners and losers. That said, 
government is justified in involving itself in the operation of the free market, for example, to 
adjust for market failure-where "real world markets fail to conform to ideal models of perfect 
competition .... The challenge ... is to achieve structural conditions for the legitimate mar-
ketplace, not to destroy the genuine freedom that the marketplace makes possible." 
ACKERMAN, Liberal Revolution, supra note 17, at 9-10. 
46. Every tradition attempts in its own way to win political legitimacy. Ian Shapiro 
summarizes five post-Enlightenment political traditions: utilitarianism, social contract, Marx-
ism, anti-Enlightenment, and democracy. See, generally, SHAPIRO, supra note 18. In the clas-
sical utilitarianism tradition, a government's legitimacy is "tied to their willingness and capac-
ity to maximize happiness." SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 2. Legitimacy in the social contract 
tradition is "rooted in the idea of agreement ... [that is,] consent of the governed, somehow 
understood [whether by actual agreement, as conceptualized by seventeenth-century social 
contractarians John Locke and Thomas Hobbes; or by hypothetical agreement, as suggested by 
twentieth-century theorists like John Rawls] is the source of the state's legitimacy." Id. at 3. 
In the Marxist tradition a government's legitimacy is tied "to the degree that [it does not] un-
derwrite exploitation and ... to the degree that [it] promoters] its antithesis, human freedom," 
Id.at 2; in the anti-Enlightenment tradition "to how well [it] embod[ies] communal values that 
shape, and give meaning to, the lives of individuals," Id. at 4, where notions of "self' are seen 
as "rooted in systems of attachment and affiliation that precede and survive individuals." Id., 
(citing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (Har-
vard 1989)); and in the democratic tradition, legitimacy exists "when those who are affected 
by decisions play an appropriate role in making them and when there are meaningful opportu-
nities to oppose the government of the day, replacing it with an alternative." Id. at 5. Ulti-
mately, of course, the inquiry of whether a government is legitimate begs the seminal ques-
tions of "[ w ]ho is to judge, and by what criteria, whether the laws and actions of states that 
claim our allegiance measure up?" Id. at 2. 
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right? 
On the first, we look always to the U.S. Constitution. If the 
claimed right is not clearly defined therein or is so ambiguous as to 
lead to uncertainty on whether it is constitutionally protected, then the 
claimed right does not merit protection. In the best common-law tra-
dition we look to as many sources as possible-historical, philosophi-
cal, theoretical, scientific, religious-and do our best through the 
power of reason to sift and synthesize these sources into animating 
principles to help us form educated conclusions of whether, pursuant 
to the Ninth Amendment "unenumerated rights" authority,47 the 
claimed right is sufficiently "fundamental" or "natural" to merit pro-
tection under the due process clause or, better yet, under a properly-
resurrected Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities clause. 
It's the best we can do, short of a pipeline to the Almighty-a privi-
lege so far as we know nobody has-fundamentalists', governments' 
and athletes' "God in my comer" claims notwithstanding. Criticisms 
of this approach as elitist are misplaced (all people, regardless of their 
station in life, may educate themselves); whereas other criticisms of 
the approach (relying as it does on judicial review)48 as undemocratic 
are accurate--democracy is simply inadequate alone to protect indi-
vidual rights, as demonstrated time and again in America. 
Applying this approach to our inquiry, the individual right to free-
dom of autonomy is encompassed within the tenus "liberty,,49 and 
"property" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process 
47. Madison said that the Ninth Amendment was "meant to guard against the possibility 
that unenumerated rights might be imperiled by the enumeration of particular rights. By ex-
cepting many rights from the grant of powers, no implication was intended, and no inference 
should be drawn, that rights not excepted from the grant of powers fell within those powers." 
LEVY,. supra note 2, at 247. The rights the Ninth Amendment protected "had to be either 
'natural rights' or 'positive rights,' to use the terms Madison employed ... [to] distinguish[] 
'the preexistent rights of nature' from those 'resulting from a social compact.'" Id. at 250. 
48. Madison wrote, '''independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a pecu-
liar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the legislative or executive, they will be naturally led to resist every 
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution.'" LEVY, supra note 2, at 
36 (quoting Madison). For his part, "Jefferson believed that an independent court could with-
stand oppressive majority impulses by holding unconstitutional any acts violating a bill of 
rights." and wrote to Madison that an advantage of a written bill of rights "was 'the legal check 
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary.'" Id. at 33 (quoting Jefferson). 
49. Freedom of autonomy encompasses, together with the Madison's "perfect equality of 
mankind," see supra note 3; the "right of privacy" liberty interest recognized by the Supreme 
Court, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court does not recognize the full 
scope of freedom of autonomy, however. 
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clauses50-at least as those tenns were originall/ I understood 
during the Revolutionary and Reconstruction eras. Leonard Levy 
reports, for example, that "[i]n the eighteenth century property did 
not mean merely the ownership of material things. Locke himself 
had not used the word to denote merely a right to things; he meant 
a right to rights . ... Americans of the founding generation under-
stood property in this general Lockean sense .... ,,52 As James 
Madison said in 1792, a: 
larger and juster meaning [of the term property] ... embraces ... 
every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a 
right. . .. [A] man has property in his opinions and the free com-
munication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his re-
ligious opinions, and in the profession and practices dictated by 
them. He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of 
his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties 
and free choice of the objects on which to employ them. In a 
word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be 
equally said to have a property in his rights. 53 
Under the Lockean and Madisonian terms, then, a proper defini-
tion of "property" would include two aspects: (i) a right to material 
"things"; and (ii) a right to non-material "thing [ s] to which a man may 
attach a value and have a right." The first "material" aspect of prop-
erty has long been recognized by the judiciary under several constitu-
tional provisions,54 the combination of which have been effective in 
50. "[N]or be deprived of life, libertY' or property, without due process of law," U.S. 
CONST. amend. V; "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process oflaw." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
51. We don't join the "originalism" versus "non-original ism" discussion right now, ex-
cept to say that for our purposes it is vitally important to understand the original intent and 
meaning of the framers on concepts of "liberty," "property," and "privileges or immunities," 
because our very consent to be governed under the Constitution's terms was based upon the 
meanings of the terms at the time of ratification. The only way we can know if the govern-
ment is upholding its end of the bargain is if we know what the bargain was in the first place. 
52. Levy, supra note 2, at 252. Locke asserted, "[People] unite[] for the general preser-
vation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name - property .... 
[B]y property I must be understood here as in other places to mean that property which men 
have in their persons as well as goods." Id. at 252-53 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988)). Levy 
notes, "[a]t least four times in his Second Treatise, Locke used the word property to mean all 
that belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished to preserve." Id. 
53. LEVY, supra note 2, at 252 (emphasis added) (quoting James Madison). This broad 
view was the Reconstruction interpretation as well. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying 
text. 
54. Specifically, material property is protected by the Fifth Amendment takings clause 
(the Court has developed a rich takings clause jurisprudence in which the judiciary will find 
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protecting individuals' material property from an overreaching gov-
ernment. 
As for the "non-material" aspect of property, looking again at 
Madison's description of property we see that all of the examples he 
lists as constituting property are freedom of autonomy rights-i.e, all 
are liberties involving an individual's rights of equality and freedom 
of choice on matters of natural private concern. Of those, most, but 
not all, are adequately protected elsewhere in the Constitution: "opin-
ions and free communication" are explicitly protected by the First 
Amendment (free speech clause), as are "religious opinions, and ... 
the[ir] profession and practices" (free exercise clause); "safety and 
liberty of his person" are also explicitly protected by, for example, the 
eighth amendment (cruel and unusual punishment, excessive bail 
clauses), and by the Art. I, section 9 right of writ of habeas corpus. 55 
Only "free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which 
to employ them,,56-classic "freedom of autonomy" rights-are no-
where else explicitly protected in the constitution-and the fact is 
courts have never protected this form of property, so "we have lost 
[it].,,57 This is why ideally we need (even if in practical terms we 
cannot get) a constitutional amendment to protect freedom of auton-
omy.58 
Continuing with our inquiry, since freedom of autonomy has 
never been adequately recognized or protected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court under the (apparently) ambiguous terms "liberty," "property," 
"privileges," and "immunities," we look to other sources, where we 
find overwhelming evidence to support a conclusion that freedom of 
autonomy is a "natural right" entitled to full constitutional protec-
unconstitutional any government action that works an uncompensated physical or regulatory 
taking of the individual's property. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a government action depriving an owner of virtually all of 
the property's value is a taking»; the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Clause; the Arti-
cle I, section 10 Contracts Clause; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
clauses. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Fourth Amendment Search and Sei-
zure Clause are incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause. Professor Amar notes, "There is a ... conspicuous connection between the 
Fourth Amendment's limitations on 'seizures' of 'houses' and 'effects' and the Fifth's restric-
tions on 'takings' of 'private property.' In both cases, state law typically defines the property 
rights given constitutional protection against federal officials." AMAR, supra note 7, at 80. 
55. LEVY, supra note 2 at 252. 
56. Id. 
57. /d. 
58. See supra note 39. 
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tion.59 
On the second question of when, if ever, government can abridge 
a fundamental or natural right, we have at least a couple choices: (a) 
government is absolutely prohibited from infringing the right, under 
any circumstances, along the lines of Justice Black's position on gov-
ernment abridgments of speech;6o or (b) government is prohibited 
from infringing the right unless it demonstrates a compelling interest 
for doing so, and its infringement is narrowly-tailored. 61 
The balance in determining the appropriate involvement of gov-
ernment is delicate-reasonable minds may, and do, differ on this 
point. It would be easy to say that government should be absolutely 
prohibited from ever infringing the right, but this essay suggests that 
the latter strict-scrutiny approach would provide adequate protection 
for a newly...;revived individual right of freedom of autonomy, while at 
the same time recognizing and accommodating the practical com-
plexities of governing in a pluralistic nation of 300 million people.62 
The First Amendment protection of freedom of speech63 pro-
vides a useful analogue. The Court has made it clear through its First 
Amendment doctrine that absolute abridgements of speech will be 
upheld only in the very most extreme of circumstances, and partial 
deprivations only if in line with rigid guidelines.64 Generally speak-
ing, strict scrutiny review is applied if the abridgement is content-
based, and intermediate scrutiny is applied if it is content-neutral, in 
which case reasonable content-neutral "time, place and manner re-
59. See supra notes 47-53; infra Section II.A. Amar describes a hierarchy of protection 
where the most fundamental "natural" rights are fully protected; and where "positive" rights 
(privileges granted by government) require equal treatment. "Equality" is itself a natural right 
of freedom of autonomy entitled to full protection. 
60. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring). 
61. This is the Court's current strict-scrutiny approach to government intrusions on fun-
damental rights. 
62. Ideally, and better yet, the Court would recognize and give effect to the Constitu-
tion's original "presumption of liberty" and limited conception of government authority, 
whereupon any government action infringing upon individual liberty is presumed unconstitu-
tional until government meets its burden of demonstrating the action is "necessary" and 
"proper." See. e.g., BARNEIT, supra note 42, at 253-69. 
63. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech .... " U.S. Const. amend. I. 
64. The judiciary's First Amendment speech doctrine holds that any governmental 
abridgment of speech is presumed to be unconstitutional and will be upheld only if the gov-
ernment meets the burden of demonstrating that it meets the appropriate heightened standard 
of review. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1045 (2005). A similar 
sort offramework could be applied to the freedom of autonomy. 
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strictions"-i.e., those that provide reasonable alternatives for the 
speech - may be upheld.65 Federal and state policymakers have come 
to understand these guidelines and are careful in trying to write laws 
and regulations that will comply-thus providing a self-regulating 
mechanism for protecting speech. 
A newly-revived and respected freedom of autonomy-most 
ideally, if not practically, stated in a constitutional amendment66-
would have a similar effect on policymakers as they come to under-
stand the following judicial doctrine: absolute deprivations of free-
dom of autonomy will be upheld in only the very most extreme of cir-
cumstances, and partial deprivations only if in line with rigid 
guidelines. Again, as with the First Amendment approach, strict scru-
tiny would be applied if the abridgement of the freedom of autonomy 
is content-based, and intermediate scrutiny if content-neutral, under 
which reasonable time, place and manner restrictions may be up-
held.67 
A. The Nature of the Right 
A natural place to start any discussion of individual liberty (and, 
for purposes of this essay, freedom of autonomy) is with John Stuart 
Mill's famous "harm principle": 
[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern ab-
solutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
compulsion and control ... that the sole end for which mankind 
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others. . .. The only part of the conduct of anyone, 
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. 
In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign.68 
65. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
66. Citations we'd like to see: "Neither Congress nor any State shall make or enforce any 
law abridging any person's individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private con-
cern." U.S. Const. amend. XXVIII. 
67. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
68. 1.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1859, reprinted in Cambridge 2000). Shapiro writes, 
think of the harm principle as operating in two steps. When evaluating a particular 
action or policy, the first step involves deciding whether the action causes, or has 
the potential to cause, harm to others. If the answer is no, then the action is in the 
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The harm principle captures the essence of the freedom of 
autonomy the framers "conferred, as against the government the right 
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.,,69 Stated several other ways (it cannot be 
stated too frequently): government may not prohibit private individual 
behavior or action causing no harm to another; or on matters of natu-
ral private concern, an individual has the full right to behave or act in 
the manner of his or her choosing free of government interference; or 
government acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the individ-
ual's right to be left alone on matters of natural private concern. 
Freedom of autonomy as conceptualized in this essay might be 
described as a sharpened version of the Millian harm principle-
sharpened, that is, to eliminate "social coercion" from its list of 
"harms" that must be prohibited?O When it comes to social coer-
self-regarding realm and the government would be unjustified in· interfering. In-
deed, in that case the government has a duty to protect the individual's freedom of 
action against interference from others as well. If, however, the answer to the initial 
query is yes, then different considerations arise. We are then in a world in which 
harm is being committed willy-nilly, and the question is: What, if anything, should 
the government do about it? In this regard, a more accurate summation of the harm 
principle than the more famous formulation already quoted can be found at the start 
of chapter four: "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the 
interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the gen-
eral welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to dis-
cussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such discussion when a person's 
conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself." 
SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 60-61 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1978 [1859], p. 73). 
69. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); see 
supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
70. Jed Rubenfeld argues effectively in FREEDOM AND TIME (Yale 2001) that Mill goes 
too far in adding freedom from social coercion to freedom from legal coercion to the formula 
for determining "the limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual 
independence." JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 230 (Yale Univ. 2001). Mill states, 
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of oth-
ers, society has jurisdiction over it. ... But ... when a person's conduct affects the 
interests of no person besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like ... 
there should be a perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the 
consequences. 
Id. (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty [1859], in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT LVIII (R.B. McCallum ed., Oxford 1946) (emphasis added). 
Rubenfeld points out that by so asserting, Mill open[ s] himself up a: 
startling internal paradox[] that the old arguments have overlooked." Id. at 231. 
Specifically, on one hand Mill asserts that in determining what sort of "harm" is suf-
ficient, there must be "direct harm to others ... [and] definite damage[s], or a defi-
nite risk of damage. . .. [M]inor ... inconvenien[ces that do not] ... prejudicially 
affect 
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cion, people simply need to develop means other than legal re-
course to deal with the problem.71 It is only when social coercion 
gives way to official legal coercion,n or perhaps when it becomes 
so op.gressive and systematic as to amount to virtual official coer-
cion, that this essay's freedom of autonomy definition of "harm" 
is implicated. 
This narrower sharpened version of the harm principle does not 
fear standardization per se but rather accepts it as a fact of life, as 
long as those who would be "standardized" do so of their own 
will, free of legal coercion. Some degree of standardization is to 
be expected and, indeed, desired-it's called community. And as 
much as Burkean or communitarian critics would have us believe 
it to be SO,74 individualist liberalism and community are not mutu-
ally exclusive concepts.75 Community provides positive, nurturing 
145 
others are not enough to justify society's legitimate interference with individual independence. 
Id. at 230 (quoting and citing Mill, supra at 67-73). On the other hand, though, in criticizing 
and seeking to forbid the "social tyranny" and "despotism of custom" that would stunt individ-
ual freedom, Mill is himself "engaged in the putatively non-regulable conduct that liberalism is 
supposed to protect. What is floridly called 'social tyranny,' what is most threatening to indi-
vidual autonomy, in fact turns out to be itself an exercise of individual autonomy-by the in-
tolerant." Id. at 232. According to Rubenfeld, then, "the individualist, Millian liberalism that 
we admire so much ... is itself the source of standardization that liberalism fears." Id. at 232. 
71. Unfortunately people can be mean-that much is evident from a very early age on the 
playground. Difficult though it is, a person behaving in a way that is in variance with that of 
the "crowd" on the playground of life needs to develop a thick skin and/or be willing to push 
back from time to time. 
n. When the school principal exercises the authority of the office to give the outlier per-
son detention, as it were ... 
73. Extending the analogy once more-when the principal stands by the side of the play-
ground and observes with arms folded while the crowd torments and ridicules the outlier per-
son day in and day out, for example. 
74. Michale Walzer writes, 
What is often taken to be the central issue between liberals and their communitarian 
critics-the constitution of the self. Liberalism, it is commonly said, is founded on 
the idea of a pre social self, a solitary and sometimes heroic individual confronting 
society, who is fully formed before the confrontation begins. . .. The [communi-
tarian] critics are commonly said in tum to believe in a radically socialized self that 
can never "confront" society because it is, from the beginning, entangled in society, 
itself the embodiment of social values. . .. Neither of these views can be sustained 
for long by anyone who goes beyond staking out a position and tries to elaborate an 
argument. 
MICHAEL WALZER, POLITICS AND PASSION 161-63 (Yale 2004). 
75. Michael Walzer points out that, 
[l]iberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups on the basis of these 
identities than by the freedom to leave the groups and sometimes even the identities 
behind. Association is always at risk in a liberal society. The boundaries of the 
group are not policed; people come and go, or they just fade into the distance with-
out ever quite acknowledging that they have left. . .. At its best, the liberal society 
HeinOnline -- 42 Willamette L. Rev. 146 2006
146 WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW [42:123 
social arrangements for human beings, who are, after all, social be-
ings.76 The value of commu,nity diminishes greatly, though, if it 
1 ·1· h 77 oses Its e ectIve c aracter. 
It is difficult at first to grasp the full magnitude of the freedom of 
autonomy concept-that individuals have total freedom on matters of 
natural private concem.78 "No, it can't be," we say, "there must be a 
catch." But the only "catch" is that we have become so conditioned 
to being told by government-mere people, after all, but acting under 
the guise and false authority of "government"-how we may behave, 
that it seems impossible to believe we may really be so free. 79 
is the "social union of social unions" that John Rawls described: a pluralism of 
groups bonded by shared ideas of toleration and democracy. 
WALZER, supra note 74, at 155. 
76. Some "[i]nvoluntary association is a permanent feature of social existence, and the 
people who fight for equality, like those who struggle to be free, are inevitably its creatures," 
and to be sure, "[d]enial is foolish, and abolition is impossible." Id. at 1,2. Walzer identifies 
four kinds of involuntary associations faced by all persons from very early in life: (J) familial 
and social ("We are born members of a kin group, of a nation or country, and of a social class; 
and we are born male or female. These ... attributes go a long way toward determining the 
people with whom we associate for the rest of our lives. "). Id. at 4; (2) cultural dictates ("As-
sociates may choose one another, but they rarely have much to say about the structure and 
style of their association. Marriage is the obvious example .... Even radically new associa-
tional practices are likely to mimic old forms-the way gay unions mimic the modem nuclear 
family and aim at the same legal recognition.") Id. at 6; (3) political ("[W]e are born citi-
zens ... and are rarely invited to agree to our citizenship. . .. [Citizens] can choose to vote or 
not, to join this or that party or movement, to form a caucus or oppositional faction, or to avoid 
political activity entirely. . .. [But] there is one thing they can't do: they can't work or live 
someplace and refuse the rights of citizenship--and the burdens, too, such as taxes and union 
dues."); Id at 7; and (4) moral-people "hear an internal voice of constraint, telling them that 
they should do this or that .... In time of trouble [one's nation, race or religion, for example, 
people may feel themselves to be morally] bound to stay and help their fellow citizens .... 
Indeed, 1 am likely to acknowledge the constraint even if I refuse to respect it-by the excuses 
I offer, the urgent reasons I invent, as I pack my bags." Id. at 9-10. 
77. "What makes any identity or affiliation voluntary is the easy availability of alterna-
tive identities and affiliations. What makes a marriage voluntary, [for example,] is the perma-
nent possibility of divorce." ld. at 161-63. In this sense the idea of separation/secession, su-
pra note 36, is itself a liberal idea-the national association is voluntary. 
78. See infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing two-tier analysis). On matters 
of positive (i.e., having been granted by government), as opposed to natural, private concern, 
the freedom is not "total," but rather "relative" in the sense that irrational discrimination is 
prohibited. Rawlsian concepts are helpful in describing the sort of equality that exists within 
freedom of autonomy: "Ignorant of their religion, race, ethnicity, gender, or social status be-
hind the veil of ignorance ... [a]ssuming that they would always be in the group disadvan-
taged by the denial of equality of access to advancement, [people] would instead embrace a 
principle of equality of opportunity." SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 132-33. 
79. Randy Bamett puts it thus: 
The Constitution that was actually enacted and formally amended creates islands of 
government powers in a sea of liberty. The judicially redacted constitution creates 
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We must constantly remind ourselves, and continue to insist in 
the face of an overbearing government, that this freedom is righifully 
ours in the first instance-freedom of autonomy is the rule in nature, 
not the exception-and it is accordingly the governmentSO that has 
been acting inappropriately all along in "creat[ing] a society with a 
network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, that none 
can escape ... [leading then to a citizenry] reduced to nothing better 
than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the govern-
ment is the shepherd."sl It is OUR individual freedom-and we must 
reclaim it from government.S2 If we continue to accept this status 
quo, we really are just timid sheep, as Tocqueville predicted. 
The founding and framing generations had a deep aversion to the 
unjust exercise of political "power," aware as they were of its rap a-
islands of liberty rights in a sea of governmental power. Judicial redaction has cre-
ated a substantially different constitution from the one written on parchment that re-
sides under glass in Washington. Thought that Constitution is now lost, it has not 
been repealed, so it could be found again. 
BARNETT, supra note 42, at 1. 
80. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about the dangers of government in his own inimitable 
fashion: 
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. . .. And this lie crawls out of 
its mouth: "I, the state, am the people." That is a lie! It was·creators who created 
peoples. . .. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them "state": they 
hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them. . .. It has invented its own lan-
guage of customs and rights. . .. Behold, how itlures them, the all-too-many-and 
how it devours them, chews them, and ruminates! "On earth there is nothing greater 
than I: the ordering finger of God am I"-thus roars the monster .... Alas, to you 
too, you great souls, it whispers its dark lies. . .. It will give you everything if you 
will adore it, this new idol: thus it buys the splendor of your virtues and the look of 
your proud eyes .... My brothers, do you want to suffocate ... ? Rather break the 
windows and leap to freedom. . .. Only where the state ends, there begins the hu-
man being who is not superfluous: there begins ... the unique and inimitable tune. 
Where the state ends-look there, my brothers! 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For One and All 48-51, 188 (Penguin 
ed. 1978 Walter Kauffman trans.). Granted, Nietzsche is over the top, but the point is valid 
that government will, if allowed to do so, insidiously inject its own "customs and rights" in 
place of those of the individual. That is precisely the point of this article-that government 
has stolen individual freedom of autonomy in America. 
81. DAHL, supra note 6, at 233 (quoting de Tocqueville, supra note 19). 
82. This view of the nature of rights is reflected in Ohioan Salmon P. Chase's famous 
oral argument in the 1847 fugitive slave case of Jones v. Van Zandt: 
The provisions of the constitution, contained in the amendments. .. rather an-
nounce restrictions upon legislative power, imposed by the very nature of society 
and of government, than create restrictions, which, were they erased from the con-
stitution, the Legislature would be at liberty to disregard. No Legislature is ... at 
liberty to disregard the fundamental principles of rectitude and justice. 
AMAR, supra note 7, at 162 and accompanying text. 
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cious nature,83 knowing that the governed must be ever vigilant to 
keep it at bay within its assigned confines.84 "'Power' to them meant 
the dominion of some men over others, the human control of human 
life: ultimately, force, compulsion. . .. Most commonly the discus-
sion of power centered on its essential characteristic of aggressive-
ness: its endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond le-
gitimate boundaries .... ,,85 
83. Bailyn Writes, 
Not that power was in itself-in some metaphysical sense-evil. It had legitimate 
foundations "in compact and mutual consent"-in those covenants among men by 
which, as a result of restrictions voluntarily accepted by all for the good of all, soci-
ety emerges from a state of nature and creates government to serve as trustee and 
custodian of the mass of surrendered individual powers. 
BAIL YN, supra note 5, at 58-59. 
[T]he point they hammered home time and again, and agreed on-freethinking An-
glican literati no less than neo-Calvinist theologians-was the incapacity of the spe-
cies, of mankind in general, to withstand the temptations of power. Such is "the de-
pravity of mankind," Samuel Adams, speaking for the Boston Town Meeting, 
declared, "that ambition and lust of power above the law are ... predominant pas-
sions in the breasts of most men." Power "converts a good man in private life to a 
tyrant in office." It acts upon men like drink: it "is known to be intoxicating in its 
nature"-"too intoxicating and liable to abuse." And nothing within man is suffi-
ciently strong to guard against these effects of power-certainly not "the united 
considerations of reason and religion," for they have never "been sufficiently pow-
erful to restrain these lusts of men." 
Jd. at 60 (citing Eliot, sermon (JHL 15), pp. 10-11, etc.) 
84. An influential writing of the day, "Molesworth's An Account of Denmark (1694)[,] 
established the general point ... that the preservation of liberty rested on the ability of the 
people to maintain effective checks on the wielders of power, and hence in the last analysis 
rested on the vigilance and moral stamina of the people." BAIL YN, supra note 5, at 65. Bailyn 
writes, "The acuteness of the colonists' sense of this problem is, for the twentieth-century 
reader, one of the most striking things to be found in this eighteenth-century literature: it 
serves to link the Revolutionary generation to our own in the most intimate way." Jd. at 57, 58. 
85. Bailyn writes, 
The essence of what the colonists meant by power was perhaps best revealed by 
John Adams as he groped for words in drafting his Dissertation on the Canon and 
Feudal Law. Twice choosing and then rejecting the word "power," he finally se-
lected as the specification of the thought he had in mind "dominion," and in this as-
sociation of words the whole generation concurred. . .. It is everywhere in public 
life, and everywhere it is threatening, pushing and grasping; and too often in the end 
it destroys its benign-necessarily benign-victim. . .. What gave transcendent 
importance to the aggressiveness of power was the act that its natural prey, its nec-
essary victim, was liberty, or law, or right. The public world these writers saw was 
divided into distinct, contrasting, and innately antagonistic spheres: the sphere of 
[government] power and the sphere of liberty or right. The one was brutal, cease-
lessly active, and heedless; the other was delicate, passive, and sensitive. The one 
must be resisted, the other defended, and the two must never be confused. 
BAll YN, supra note 5, at 57-58 (citations omitted). 
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Of course "We the People" understand that we cannot have abso-
lute free reign-we do, after all, live in a nation with three hundred 
million other souls, and to the extent our behavior harms or concerns 
others, we accept that we must yield, and we entrust to government 
the authority to manage those things that government necessarily and 
properly manages.86 Moreover, we understand that even if our behav-
ior does not harm or concern others, government may in the proper 
circumscribed exercise of its responsibilities sometimes find it neces-
sary and proper to impose, within strict guidelines, "reasonable con-
tent-neutral time, place and manner restrictions" that may affect our 
activity.87 
We also understand we may expect a different level of constitu-
tional protection depending on whether our activity involves a natural 
right or a positive right. Classic "freedom of autonomy" rights are 
natural rights, those pre-political liberties existing as a part of the 
greater order possessed by every individual from birth that cannot be 
extinguished by any mere human government, and are entitled to full 
protection whereas positive rights, those granted through the political 
process (common-law, state law, federal law, or otherwise) are enti-
tled to relative equality of protection (i.e. the government may not ar-
bitrarily discriminate in granting and enforcing those rights.)88 So, for 
86. The devil is in the details of course-in this case, what does it mean to "harm" or 
"concern" others? To be sure, in a butterfly-effect sense, one's activity always affects others 
in some way, however infinitesimally, but for our purposes the terms are strictly defined-to 
use a tort or criminal law analogue, there must be some cognizable "injury." One's actions 
emphatically do NOT "harm" or "concern" if they "disgust," "repulse," "anger," "upset," "dis-
appoint," or otherwise "offend" others .. Others' own opinions on moral and social issues are 
just that--{)pinions, and their opinions do not rule us. We don't presume to tell others how to 
live their lives-and we especially don't attempt to add the coercive powers of government to 
impose our opinions on them-and we expect and demand the same treatment in return. 
87. As with the Court's analogous First Amendment doctrine, the key is that the regula-
tion does not work an outright ban on the activity - the activity may still occur at a alternative 
reasonable time or place, or in an alternative reasonable manner. See supra notes 59-64 and 
accompanying text. 
88. Professor Amar proposes this sort of two-tier system as a tool for assigning the 
proper level of protection originally contemplated for various "privileges-or-immunities" of 
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Section I is not limited to privileges and immunities 
specified in the pre-I 866 Constitution. Other, common-law rights were also included .... For 
those nonconstitutional rights, perhaps only antidiscrimination ("equal") protection should be 
accorded, rather than fundamental rights ("full") protection." AMAR, supra note 7, at 178 (cit-
ing John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale LJ. 1385 
(1992); Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM.J. 
LEGAL HIST. 305, 323 (1988). For similar views, see I D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 347-50 (1985); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
115-24 (1988)." AMAR, supra note 7, at 367. Amar doesn't use the terms "natural law" and 
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example, whereas sexual freedom and freedom of association are 
natural rights and thus entitled to full protection, marriage of any de-
scription (same-sex, different-sex) is entitled to equal protection as a 
positive right.89 Under similar reasoning, freedom of association (in 
all circumstances, economic included) is a natural right and thus enti-
tled to full protection whereas, economically-based associations cre-
ated by state law or by common-law (e.g., contracts), are positive 
rights entitled to equal protection.90 
B. Freedom of Autonomy Applied 
Consider five activities: three currently prohibited by govern-
ment-same-sex marriage (sexual freedom), right to die; and posses-
sion/use of soft drugs (marijuana);91 one formerly prohibited and cur-
rently under heavy attack-abortion; and one protected from the 
beginning, but becoming less well-protected in the modem era-
religion. We could go on, but for our purposes, the point is illustrated 
by these several examples.92 
"positive law" in this passage (perhaps they are implicit), but the same two-tier system is use-
ful in determining the proper level of protection for those freedom of autonomy rights, not oth-
erwise explicitly "specified and 'declared' by We the People [in the Constitution and hence] 
were easy cases for full protection," that exist as a matter of natural law (deserving of "full" 
protection) as opposed to positive law (deserving of "equal" protection). AMAR, supra note 7, 
at 179. It also bears repeating that the right of equality generally, free of context, is itself a 
natural right entitled to full protection. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
89. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
90. Amar offers the two-tier approach as a possible solution to the troubling "specter of 
judges invalidating statutes by invoking nontextually specified fundamental rights and by giv-
ing constitutional status to common-law rights like freedom of contract... [a fa] 
Lochner .... " AMAR, supra note 7, at 178 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905». 
For another intriguing, un-p.c. perspective on Lochner, see BARNETT, supra note 42, at 211-
18. 
91. Many-perhaps even most-Americans will respond, "Of course these activities are 
prohibited-what sort of decent society would not do the same?" A literal answer would be, 
"Decent countries not doing the same include, to varying degrees, The Netherlands, Belgium, 
and more recently, Canada." This is where Americans must be reconditioned to reframe the 
question to one that more accurately reflects the spirit of the modem Enlightenment and of 
America's own founding generation, "I may personally disagree with the activities, but what 
sort of decent government would [deign to] presume to tell individuals how they should and 
should not behave?" The point is, we start, and operate, with a presumption of liberty. 
92. "Life" itself might be said to be the ultimate autonomy freedom, in which event the 
U.S. Supreme Court's allowance under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments due process 
clauses of federal and state governments' use of the death sentence would violate this freedom. 
The death sentence is an entirely separate discussion-those convicted of capital crimes in 
those states allowing the death penalty have caused grievous harm to another. Because this 
essay's "freedom of autonomy" is premised on liberty to act in any way that does not harm 
another (or, at most, only nominally harms another), this essay does not include "life" in its 
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1. Same-sex Marriage (Sexual Freedom) 
The institution of marriage, created as' it is by common-law and 
state law, is a positive right entitled to equal constitutional protec-
tion;93 whereas sexual freedom, the individual liberty one would exer-
cise within any marriage,94 is a natural right entitled to full constitu-
tional protection. This much has been essentially recognized by the 
Supreme Court in the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas,95 which held that 
private sexual activity is protected as right of privacy under the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause.96 While Lawrence was an im-
portant victory for freedom of autonomy, the very narrowness of the 
margin (6-3 and 5-4) is telling on the point that freedom of autonomy 
protection, even where it exists, is tenuous at best--demonstrating yet 
again the ideal solution of constitutional amendment to provide more 
lasting protection. 
As noted, marriage is a positive right entitled to equal constitu-
tional protection. This much most assuredly has not been recognized 
by the Supreme Court, by the thirteen states passing constitutional 
amendments in 2004 banning same-sex marriage,97 or by numerous 
other governmental bodies that discriminate against same-sex cou-
definition of freedom of autonomy. 
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text describing of two-tier framework designat-
ing "full" protection for natural rights and "equal" protection for positive rights. To the extent 
one might suggest that polygamy should likewise be treated equally under the two-tier frame-
work, arguably freedom of autonomy does not extend to associations where the terms are ex-
tremely unfavorable toward one class of people (in this case women) who possess a severe 
deficit of bargaining power. See generally JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF 
HEA YEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH (2003) explainingthe realities of the institution of po-
lygamy). 
94. Freedom of association is another natural right one exercises in making a decision to 
marry-a right that is on firm footing in the Court's First Amendment speech doctrine. 
95. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See supra note 4. 
96. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Court struck down a state law prohibiting certain 
specified sexual behavior (sodomy) on two separate grounds: (a) substantive due process (pri-
vacy); and (b) equal protection, reversing its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986), which had held that government infringements on private sexual activity were en-
titled to deferential rational-basis review. See, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S 
LIBERTARIAN REVOLUTION: LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, 2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21, 21 (2003) 
(writing that "what was most striking about Lawrence was the way the Court justified its rul-
ing. If the approach the Court took in the case is followed in other cases in the future, we have 
in Lawrence nothing short of a constitutional revolution, with implications reaching far beyond 
the "personal liberty" at issue here. . .. [T]he Lawrence majority did not protect a 'right of 
privacy.' Instead, quite simply, they protected 'liberty. "'). 
97. See supra note 8 (commenting that the amendments were ostensibly to ban same-sex 
marriage, but in fact their intent and scope are far broader than that in curbing the rights of gay 
Americans.) 
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pIes. Government offers legal recognition to married couples. With 
legal recognition comes certain benefits; for example, spouses are en-
titled by law to social security benefits, consideration under intestacy 
statutes, and medical insurance. By electing to extend these benefits 
to one group of people (heterosexual couples), but not to another 
(same-sex couples), based on the manner that the two groups exercise 
an underlying natural right entitled to full constitutional protection, 
government engages in irrational discrimination and deprives the in-
dividuals in the same-sex couples of their freedom of autonomy. 
If I decide I want to marry another man, my action does not harm 
or injure another. Does it disgust some and repulse others? Yes. But 
the fact that majorities may find the private activities of a disfavored 
minority distasteful or even repulsive does not give the majority a 
right, through abusive and illegitimate use of government mecha-
nisms, to impose their own values on the minority. If the majority 
decides instead to remove legal recognition of marriage for all, it may 
legitimately do SO,98 but it may not disfavor one group by failing to 
extend the same positive rights to that group as it does to the favored 
group. 
Even if one's sexual orientation were a matter of choice,99 argu-
ments suggesting that same-sex marriage threatens the institution of 
traditional heterosexual marriage ignorantly fail to account for the in-
nate biological drive to perpetuate the species. There are few instincts 
more powerful-as long as humans continue to walk the face of the 
earth, a critical mass will enter into associations, such as heterosexual 
marriage, that lend themselves to the perpetuation of the species. Bi-
ology does not need the help of moralistic conservative Christians. 
Moreover, and perhaps more basically still, how can long-term com-
mitted loving relationships be wrong, to the point where government 
98. The Supreme Court has held that the right to marry, as part of the larger right offam-
ily autonomy, is fundamental. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In this context, 
"fundamental" is not analogous to "natural." Marriage, though described as "fundamental" by 
the Court for purposes of its substantive due process privacy doctrine, simply is not a natural 
right. To the extent the Court would suggest otherwise, it misconceives the right. The fact 
that the state does not endorse a particular institution does not mean that people may not con-
tinue to exercise the natural right of association to cohabitate and spend their lives together and 
consider themselves as "married" for their own purposes, but the state is not required to recog-
nize the institution in the first instance. 
99. There are many arguments for and against on this point-with the more persuasive 
that one's sexual orientation is not a matter of choice; rather, it is innate. Whether sexual ori-
entation is or is not a matter of choice matters not one whit one way or another to the freedom 
of autonomy principle. 
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will not support them? 
In sum, the fact that the judiciary does not consistentli OO recog-
nize the obvious equal protection problems 101 in such discrimination 
is ample evidence that judicial review, important as it is, ultimately is 
inadequate to protect the freedom of autonomy rights of an oppressed 
minority from majority tyranny. 
2. Right to Die 
I may have a terminal physical condition that irreparably impairs 
my quality of life and elect, after much thought, that I wish to end my 
suffering by hastening my own death. Does my action harm or injure 
others? No. Does it upset and offend some others? Yes. But as 
Bishop John Shelby Spong,102 an articulate Christian spokesperson 
favoring choice in end-of-life decisions, puts it, "I believe that if and 
when a person arrives at that point in human existence when death has 
become a kinder alternative than hopeless pain ... then the basic hu-
man right to choose how and when to die should be guaranteed by 
law and respected by our communities of faith. . .. My deepest de-
sire is always to choose death with dignity over a life that has become 
either hopelessly painful and dysfunctional or empty and devoid of all 
meaning. . .. That does not seem to me to be too much to ask my 
faith to give me or my government to guarantee for me.,,103 
100. Courts are all over the board on this. See infra note 196. 
10 I. Put it this way: If a recount of votes in Florida in the 2000 presidential election, as 
had been ordered (as required under state law) by the highest court in the sovereign state of 
Florida, violates the equal protection of voters, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000), 
certainly failing to extend the same marriage benefits to a person based on the fact he or she 
wishes to marry someone of the same gender is also an equal protection violation. 
102. Mr. Spong is Eighth Bishop of Newark of the Episcopal Church. At the time of his 
retirement in 2000 Bishop Spong was the senior active bishop in the Episcopal Church in the 
United States. 
103. John Shelby Spong, Death: A Friend to be Welcomed Not an Enemy to be Defeated, 
Address to the Nat' I Convention of the Hemlock Society (January 10, 2003) (transcript 
available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/files/resource/spong%20address%202003.pdf). 
Bishop Spong, on the credibility of Christian moralizing about the sanctity of life: 
If human beings who call themselves Christians have no scruples about endorsing 
war, killing religious enemies or imposing the sentence of death upon those who 
violate either the norms of faith, or the boundaries of prejudice under a particular set 
of circumstances in the past, is it still appropriate for Christians to suggest that one 
cannot elect death for himself or herself under a different set of circumstances in the 
present? It seems to me that a certain irrational inconsistency is operating here, 
which needs to be pointed out to any faith community that espouses such claims. 
Id. at 4. 
And on the Christian view of death: 
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And there are government voices of reason on this issue as well, 
such as California Assembly member Lloyd Levine commenting in 
support of the Compassionate Choice Act of 2005, an aid-in-dying 
bill introduced this year in the California Assembly: "This is a very 
personal issue .... It is not up to me to substitute my moral views on 
you, and it's not up to anyone else to substitute their moral views on 
anyone else,,;104 and former Vermont governor Phil Hoff, speaking in 
support of the Vermont Death with Dignity Act of 2005 currently un-
der consideration by the Vermont legislature: "While I respect people 
making different choices for themselves, a small minority of Ver-
monters should not be able to impose their views on the vast majority 
of Vermonters that want more choice and control at the end of our 
lives. ,,105 
Oregon is the only state to date that has enacted legislation (the 
1998 Oregon Death with Dignity law) protecting this natural individ-
ual right of freedom of choice in end-of-life decisions. All of the cur-
rent legislative efforts-the Oregon law as well as the proposed legis-
lation in Vermont and California-share several elements that must 
be met if a person is to self-hasten death in accordance with law: 
"[(i)] a person must be a terminally ill adult, [(ii)] two doctors must 
agree that the person is competent (either doctor may require psycho-
logical testing), [(iii)] the request must be made three separate times 
and may be withdrawn at any time, and [(iv)] the person must acquire 
the medication and the medication must be self-administered."lo6 
But let there be no mistake about what is happening. These stirring [technological] 
achievements [expanding life expectancy] represent human beings taking on the 
power we once ascribed only to God. We have by our own knowledge and exper-
tise put our hands on the decisions about life and death. We cannot now refuse to 
engage these decisions at the end of our own lives. . .. We have watched human 
life actually evolve to where it must accept God-like responsibilities. The time has 
come to celebrate that, not to hide from it in the language of piety .... It is one 
thing, however, to expand life and it is quite another to postpone death. When 
medical science shifts from expanding the length and quality of life and begins sim-
ply to postpone the reality of death, why are we not capable of saying that the sa-
credness of life is no longer being served, and therefore Christians must learn to act 
responsibly in the final moments oflife. 
Id. at 9. 
104. COMPASSION & CHOICES, ADVOCACY BULLETIN (Vol. II, Issue II March 14, 
2005), at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/files/articlelbulletin 03.05.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 
2005). 
105. Id. 
106. End-Of-Life Choices, Frequently-Asked-Questions, at http://www.endoflifechoices. 
org/learn/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 8, 2005). The Oregon Department of Human Services' 
recent report on the seventh year statistics on the law "show that 37 people ended their lives 
HeinOnline -- 42 Willamette L. Rev. 155 2006
2006] FREEDOM OF AUTONOMY 155 
As reflected by these state efforts, end-of-life choice is one indi-
vidual freedom of autonomy interest a solid majority of the People 
apparently do supportl07-perhaps because they recognize that they 
themselves, rather than some nameless others, may desire to exercise 
the right at some future date. Thus it is disappointing, though of 
course unsurprising and entirely consistent, that Congress and the 
Bush administration would seek to remove this freedom and impose 
their own set of moral views on others-and so have sued to have the 
Oregon law declared unconstitutiona1. I08 The government's lawsuit 
seeking to remove an individual liberty previously protected by state 
law is grossly inappropriate on two levels: one, for our immediate 
purposes, it fails to protect individual freedom of autonomy on a mat-
ter of natural private concern; two, it violates principles of comity in 
federal-state relations by interfering with the policy determination of 
a sovereign state engaged in regulating, under its Tenth Amendment 
reservation of authority, a matter reserved to state governments. This 
is another instance of overbearing federal interference with individual 
autonomy and with state prerogative ... this is why We the People 
need a constitutional amendment protecting freedom of autonomy. 
3. Soft Drugs 
F or close to 400 years-from the time of the first American 
hemp crop in 1611 near Jamestown, Virginia through the tum of the 
twentieth-century-marijuana (then known as hemp) was grown in 
America for its fiber content. Indeed, "King James I of Britain or-
under the law in 2004, slightly fewer than in 2003. As required by law, all were terminally ill 
and made repeated and voluntary requests for assistance." COMPASSION & CHOICES, supra 
note 104. 
107. Seventy percent of respondents to a 2005 Field Poll in California "agreed that a 
mentally competent, terminally ill adult should be able to receive aid from their doctor to die 
peacefully." COMPASSION & CHOICES, supra note 104. (citing www.caforaidindying.org). 
In a recent poll conducted by Zogby International in Vermont, "[n]early SO percent ofrespon-
dents said they would support a bill allowing terminally ill patients to receive medication from 
their doctors to hasten their deaths." Id. (citing www.choicesvermont.org). An Episcopalian 
convention of the Diocese of Newark, consisting of 450 elected lay people and 150 ordained 
Episcopalian clergy, after a year of open hearings "endorsed by a 2 to I majority ... physician 
assisted suicide as a moral option for Christians." Spong, supra note 9S at 1-2 (citing 
www.dioceseofnewark.org). 
lOS. The Oregon law prevailed at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Oregon v. 
Ashcroft, 36S F.3d IllS (9th Cir. 2004), and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the gov-
ernment's appeal in Gonzales v. Oregon, with oral arguments scheduled for Fall 2005. The 
government argues that the federal Controlled Substances Act authorizes the government to 
preempt state regulations allowing the use of such substances in the end-of-life choice process. 
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dered settlers to engage in wide scale farming of the plant. Most of 
the sails and ropes on colonial ships were made from hemp as were 
many of the colonists' bibles, clothing and maps. [And in the most 
delicious irony of all, according to some historians, George Washing-
ton and Thomas Jefferson cultivated marijuana and advocated a 
hemp-based economy.,,109 
Fast forward to the twenty-first century, when use or possession 
of marijuana is illegal and aggressively enforced (734,000 criminal 
arrests per year) and prosecuted by the federal and many state gov-
ernments, at a cost of anywhere from $7.5-$10 billion per year. Aside 
from being crazy policy (crazy or not, policy is ordinarily within the 
proper realm of a democratically-elected legislature), 110 the govern-
ment's zeal in apprehending and punishing even minor offenders who 
would use marijuana occasionally is just plain bizarre. III The odd-
109. THE NAT'L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS, NORML REPORT ON 
SIXTY YEARS OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE U.S., 3 (2003), at 
http://www.norml.comJpdCfiles/NORML_Report_Sixty_ Years_ US_Prohibition. pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2005). 
110. Objectively, there are numerous policy reasons to decriminalize marijuana: (1) cost 
of enforcement-"taxpayers annually spend between $7.5 billion and $10 billion arresting and 
prosecuting individuals for marijuana violations, [with approximately 734,000 or more annual 
arrests] than the total number of arrestees for all violent crime combined, including murder, 
rape, robbery and aggravated assault"; (2) harm caused by criminal prohibition of marijuana is 
much greater than harm caused by marijuana use itself-As former President Jimmy Carter 
said, "Penalties against drug use should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of 
the drug itself. Nowhere is this more clear than in the laws against the possession of marijuana 
in private for personal use"; (3) decriminalization does not lead to increased marijuana use-
More than 30 percent of the U.S. population lives under some form of marijuana decriminali-
zation (Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio and Oregon), and according to government and academic studies, 
these laws have not contributed to an increase in marijuana consumption-moreover, decrimi-
nalization appears to reduce rates of hard drug use in states that have decriminalized; (4) 
medical benefits: 
Written references to the use of marijuana as a medicine date back nearly 5,000 
years. Western medicine embraced marijuana's medical properties in the mid-
1800s, and by the beginning of the 20th century, physicians had published more than 
100 papers in the Western medical literature recommending its use for a variety of 
disorders. 
Twelve states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Washington) have legalized marijuana for medical use. The 
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, at http://www.norml.com (citing 
numerous sources), (last visited April 20, 2005). 
Ill. Marijuana is no different than other soft drugs like alcohol and tobacco. It may be 
similarly taxed and regulated. As with alcohol, for example, it becomes a matter of public 
concern if I operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, since chances are 
increased that I may have an accident and cause physical harm or injury to another; accord-
ingly, government is justified in preventing me from mixing the activities. Indeed, if legisla-
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ness started in the 1920s and in 1930 with the government's estab-
lishment of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). In response to an 
FBN-sponsored campaign, reefer-madness hysteria took hold in the 
1930s, prompting 27 states to pass laws prohibiting marijuana. "For 
example, a news bulletin issued by the FBN in the mid-1930s pur-
ported that a user of marijuana 'becomes a fiend with savage or 'cave-
man' tendencies. His sex desires are aroused and some of the most 
horrible crimes result. He hears light and sees sound. To get away 
from it, he suddenly becomes violent and may kill. ",112 
The "Marihuana Tax Act of 1937," criminalizing the possession 
or use of marijuana, was passed after two Congressional hearings 
(one House, one Senate) totaling just one hour, after debate in the 
House lasting 90 seconds, and with similar alacrity in the Senate. In 
the House Ways and Means Committee hearing, two witnesses, the 
head of the FBN and a Treasury Department Assistant General Coun-
sel, testified in favor of the bill, and a physician representative from 
the American Medical Association (AMA) testified against. The 
committee took little interest in the AMA's views, however, telling 
the physician, "If you want to advise us on legislation, you ought to 
come here with some constructive proposals ... rather than trying to 
throw obstacles in the way of something that the federal government 
is trying to do." Adding insult to injury, during the 90 seconds of de-
bate in the House, a member of the committee lied in response to a 
question 113 of whether the AMA supported the bill, stating, "Their 
Doctor . . . gave this measure his full support . . . [as well as] the ap-
proval [of] the American Medical Association.,,114 
And the federal government-sponsored hysteria, as regrettably 
enabled by the Supreme Court, I 15 continues to this day. The point for 
tures stopped to think with some clarity on the issue, they would recognize that another weed, 
tobacco, has been a major contributor to state economies (as was hemp, see supra text accom-
panying note 109) from the earliest pre-Revolutionary days. 
112. NORML Report, supra note 109, at 3 (citing Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Marihuana 
Reconsidered, at 11(2d ed.) (San Francisco: Quick American Archives, 1994)). 
113. The only other question asked for a summary of the bill, to which Speaker Sam 
Rayburn replied, "I don't know. It has something to do with a thing called marijuana. 1 think 
it's a narcotic of some kind." NORML Report, supra note 109, at 4. 
114. NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., at 
http://www.norml.comlindex.cfrn?Group_ID=4428. (last visited Sep. 17,2005). 
115. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2219 (2005) where the Court agreed with 
the Bush administration's broad commerce clause arguments to strictly interpret and enforce 
the federal Controlled Substances Act against the State of California's law allowing the pre-
scribed medical use of marijuana. 
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our purposes is that the government's prohibition of marijuana by any 
means (including its current over-the-top approach) violates the indi-
vidual right of freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private 
concem. 116 As James Madison wrote, speaking on behalf of a found-
ing generation overwhelmingly "focused on the effort to free the indi-
vidual from the oppressive misuse of power, from the tyranny of the 
state," I 17 every person has a "[right] in the free use of his faculties and 
free choice of the objects on which to employ them.,,118 
4. Abortion 
If we accept for a moment (for purpose of argument only) that 
life-with its full set of intact constitutional protections-begins at 
conception,119 abortion presents the especially hard case where one 
person's exercise of individual freedom of autonomy not only inter-
feres with the autonomy rights of another, but actually causes an ab-
solute deprivation of the other's rights-the classic zero-sum game. 
116. Any harm or injury caused by a person using marijuana is to that individual alone, 
no one else. As with tobacco and alcohol there is an expense to society in the form of health-
care cost and loss of productivity, but these are costs of freedom-much as military spending 
is a cost of freedom. And of course society can attempt to reduce or make up for these costs 
through various means, not the least of which would be the cost savings ($7.5-$10 billion an-
nually, by some estimates) realized from ending the "war on drugs" against marijuana "of-
fenders." See supra note 110. What about hard drugs like heroin, crack cocaine, etc.? The 
freedom of autonomy approach is open to (but not convinced by) the argument that there is a 
point at which the use and possession of those items is so demonstrably harmful to society as a 
whole that government may legitimately prohibit them, in which case the means of dealing 
with the issue-whether through punishment, treatment, etc.-is a policy matter for the elected 
legislative body. On the other hand, whereas governments everywhere have erred on the side 
of paternalism even with marijuana, the freedom of autonomy principle is also open to--and 
on balance favors - the argument that because hard drugs are harmful to the using individual, 
not others, they should not be prohibited. They may be heavily regulated and controlled under 
this argument - but not prohibited. Government paternalism is not the answer-rather, educa-
tion on the health dangers (as with tobacco) will help prevent people from using. This second 
argument has several advantages over the first: (I) it need not be concerned with the su-
premely difficult task in differentiating those substances so harmful as to be absolutely prohib-
ited from those that are not; (2) it ameliorates many problems associated with prohibition, such 
as the violence associated with trafficking; (3) it adheres to the guiding principle of resolving 
any close calls in favor of the presumption of liberty-i.e., favoring individual freedom of 
autonomy, instead of government prohibition. 
117. BAIL YN, supra note 5, at v-vi. 
118. LEVY, supra note 2, at 252. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
119. The contemporary arguments over abortion are well-documented, and we will not 
re-visit them here. At the core of the debate is a seemingly intractable disagreement: one side 
says life begins at conception; the other says it begins at birth (or perhaps viability), and never 
the twain shall meet. Each side is passionate in its views; neither hears what the other is say-
ing-both talk past one another. 
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Moreover, abortion is the hardest case of all because a choice must be 
made-indeed, a woman's postponing or avoiding action is itself an 
affirmative choice to have a baby. 
For our purposes the question is who will make this decision? 
Will it be the government as proxy for the nascent life? Or rather will 
the woman be free to make this most difficult of decisions on her own 
behalf? 
Applying freedom of autonomy principles, the answer is not 
automatic. To the extent that by prohibiting abortion the government 
is acting to protect the right of the zygote, embryo or fetus 120 to be left 
alone on a matter of natural private concern (to live), it is acting le-
gitimately. On the other hand, prohibiting abortion certainly does not 
leave a woman alone on a matter of private concern, and thus violates 
her individual freedom of autonomy. 
But this assumes that fully-protected life begins at conception-
an assumption that a rational approach simply cannot make. The 
rights of a zygote, embryo or early fetus cannot be equated with those 
of a late-tenn fetus or an infant-the latter possess some measure of 
human consciousness,121 whereas a zygote, embryo or early fetus does 
not. The woman's freedom of autonomy must prevail at this early 
stage. When the fetus achieves viability-where it can survive on its 
own independently of the mother-the equation shifts. For freedom 
of autonomy purposes the fetus is a person at the point of viability, 
and the state is justified in prohibiting abortion to protect that per-
son's right to be left alone to live, subject to the usual exceptions for 
mother's health and other extenuating circumstances. 
This is the proper approach. For a solid five-plus months, before 
the fetus reaches viability, the woman's choice prevails. From viabil-
ity onward, the fetus-person's choice, as enabled by government, pre-
vails (subject to exceptions). The woman has a choice; once that 
choice is made she bears a responsibility. On this score, the Supreme 
Court has done an effective job of attempting to strike a reasoned bal-
ance between the competing interests by developing exactly this 
framework-before viability, government may not impose an "undue 
120. A zygote is the "cell fonned [at conception] by the union of two gametes"; an em-
bryo is a "human organism in the first eight weeks from conception"; a fetus is "a human em-
bryo of eight weeks or more." THE AMERICAN CENTURY DICTIONARY, (Warner Books Pa-
perback ed.) (Oxford 1995). 
121. "Consciousness" may be detennined by measuring, for example, brain function or 
pain response. 
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burden" on a woman's ability to have an abortion; after viability, the 
government is justified in restricting abortion, subject to excep-
tions. 122 
Jed Rubenfeld offers as incisive a description as any on the inap-
propriateness of outright government prohibition of abortion: 
It is impossible to name a single prohibitory law in our legal sys-
tem with greater affirmative, [indeed] conscriptive, life-occupying 
effects than those imposed by a law forcing a woman to bear a 
child against her will. ['It compels this woman to bear a child. It 
forces motherhood upon her. '] This woman is physically taken 
over for a purpose dictated to her by the state, and this taking-over 
can be expected to last not merely nine months but for many years 
thereafter. Her body, her mind, and her time will be substantially 
occupied by the task that the state has forced upon her. She has 
been instrumentalized, impressed into state-dictated service. It is 
no exaggeration to say that a law forcing women to be mothers is a 
totalitarian intrusion into their lives. 123 
5. Religion 
Recognition of the freedom of autonomy amendment would also 
reinforce other fundamental rights, some of which receive short shrift 
from the judiciary. For example, although the First Amendment 
guarantees the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court currently 
allows government to prohibit free exercise with neutral, generally 
applicable laws that meet the less rigorous intermediate-scrutiny stan-
dard of review. Under the freedom of autonomy approach, free exer-
cise may be' subject to reasonable content-neutral time, place and 
manner restrictions, but they may not be prohibited outright except in 
the most exceptional cases in which the government overcomes the 
heavy presumption of invalidity and satisfies strict scrutiny standard 
of review. 124 
The Court's intermediate-scrutiny standard for generally appli-
cable, neutral laws affecting free exercise was enunciated in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith l25 in 1990.126 Smith led to Congress's passage of the 1993 Re-
122. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-71 (1992). An "undue bur-
den" is defined as a government action that places a "substantial obstacle" in the way of the 
woman in her efforts to get an abortion. [d. at 877. 
123. RUBENFELD, supra note 70, at 225-26. 
124. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
125. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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ligious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) , specifying "[g]overnment 
may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(l) is in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est.,,127 In other words, any generally applicable, neutral law affecting 
the free exercise of religion shall be subject to strict scrutiny in the 
courts. 128 In 1997, the Court in tum struck down RFRA as beyond 
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment section Five scope of authority in 
City of Boerne v. Flores,129 stating that the Act, by telling the Court 
what standard of review to use in a particular case went beyond the 
mere enforcement of existing rights and instead created new substan-
tive rights not given in the Fourteenth Amendment. l3O 
For our purposes, the Court misses the boat in Smith and Boerne. 
Freedom of autonomy principles recognize the legitimate role of gov-
ernment in applying, under firm guidelines, reasonable content-
neutral time, place and manner restrictions on individual liberty of 
free choice on matters of natural private concern,131 but require that 
any outright prohibition carry a heavy presumption of invalidity and 
must satisfy strict scrutiny review to survive.132 The Court does not 
126. See id. at 885-90. Smith, a member of the Native American Church who was denied 
unemployment benefits from the state after being convicted for violating a state law prohibit-
ing the use of hallucinogenic drugs, claimed that resulting denial of benefits constituted a vio-
lation of his free exercise rights. Id. at 874. The Court upheld Smith's conviction. Id. at 890. 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1993). Smith and RFRA represent something of an ironic 
role-reversal, with the Court taking a less protective view of a freedom of autonomy right than 
Congress-here Congress seeks to protect the free exercise of religion from government inter-
ference (ironically still, it is an Act of Congress itself-i.e., punishing the use of soft drugs -
that constituted the government interference), and it is the Court that is less protective of the 
right. Congress thereafter amended its law to include an exception for use of peyote by Native 
Americans in tribal rituals. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)). 
128. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000bb-l(b). 
129. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, parishioners of a Catholic Church claimed that a 
municipality's denial of the Church's application for a zoning variance to build an addition 
onto its facilities constituted a violation of their free exercise rights. Id. at 511-12. 
130. 521 U.S. at 529-34. 
131. See supra notes 63-67,87 and accompanying text, discussing the Court's analogous 
speech doctrine allowing the limiting regulations only if they offer reasonable content-neutral 
time, place or manner alternatives. These legitimate restrictions, of which there are many ex-
amples, are less objectionable precisely because they are limits, not outright prohibitions. The 
limits on free exercise, by contrast, offer no such alternative-Smith was prohibited outright 
from practicing his religion free of government recrimination. Smith, 521 U.S. at 890. 
132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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distinguish in Smith and Boerne between government restrictions and 
prohibitions-it simply applies a blanket rule that any generally ap-
plicable, neutral rule gets intermediate scrutiny regardless of its pro-
hibitory effect on free exercise. 133 In Smith, the underlying neutral, 
generally applicable law created an outright prohibition on one's free 
exercise of religion, so it should have been strictly scrutinized; 
whereas the underlying neutral, generally applicable zoning decision 
by the city of Boerne in applying its local ordinance merely placed a 
place restriction on the church, so it was properly reviewed under in-
termediate scrutiny. 134 
On structural separation of powers grounds, Boerne was cor-
rectly decided. The Court was justified in holding that Congress ex-
ceeded its Fourteenth Amendment section 5 powers in attempting to 
dictate to the Court how it will exercise its power of judicial re-
view. 135 Congress cannot tell the judiciary substantively how to adju-
dicate cases, whereas the Constitution can. 136 And a reading of the 
Constitution true to its libertarian origins recognizes a broad right to 
freedom of autonomy. 137 
c. Foundations 
To appreciate the American colonists' view of individual liberty, 
one must understand their own sense of history. They had come re-
cently out of oppressive circumstances of government tyranny and 
had a visceral understanding of the dangers posed to individual liberty 
by unrestrained government. 138 Their native land, England, through 
133. See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872; Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. 
134. The city's denial of the zoning variance was a neutral "place" restriction. Whether 
it was a reasonable neutral time, place or manner restriction is another matter-maybe it was, 
maybe it was not, but that is a separate question. 
135. See generally Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-34. 
136. See U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147-48 (1871). 
137. The First Amendment establishment clause, the structural support holding up Jeffer-
son's strict wall of separation between church and state (protecting government from the influ-
ence of any particular religion, and also in "protecting my religion from government," as one 
colleague, Frank Ravitch, puts it), is under siege as well. The Court's two 2005 decisions re-
garding whether government may impose the majority's religious viewpoint on all citizens by 
allowing placement of religious paraphernalia on government property do not help - holding 
in one case that the Ten Commandments may stay on government grounds, and in the other 
case that the Ten Commandments may not stay on government grounds. See generally 
McCreary County, Ky v. ACLU ofKy, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding that Ten Cornmand-
ments may not stay on government grounds); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) 
(holding that Ten Commandments may stay on government grounds). 
138. See generally BAILYN, supra note 5. 
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the centuries had endured alternating episodes of royal despotism and 
commoner anarchy infringing upon liberty, with liberty most recently 
only narrowly emerging from its trials intact in what "had been a 
close victory which would require the utmost vigilance to main-
tain.,,139 Elsewhere in the world, liberty had been lost. 140 
"It had been at this critical juncture in the history of England and 
of liberty," Bailyn writes, "that America had been settled. The con-
junction had not been accidental. 'It was this great struggle that peo-
pled America ... a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a 
horror, of the infernal confederacy [of temporal and spiritual tyranny] 
projected, conducted, and accomplished the settlement of Amer-
139. See id. at 81. In the minds of the colonists, among the primary reasons liberty was 
able to prevail in Britain was that: 
[g]radually safeguards against such evils [threatening liberty] were built up-that 
great array of documents starting with Magna Carta that outlined the inner bounda-
ries of English liberties-which remained effective until, in the seventeenth century, 
that "execrable race of the Stuarts" precipitated a "formidable, violent, and bloody" 
struggle between the people and the confederacy "of temporal and spiritual tyr-
anny." In the end liberty, as all the world knew, had been re-established in England. 
Id. at 81 (citing and quoting, e.g., James Otis, Rights of the British Colonies (JHL 7), p.31; 
Bland, Inquiry (JHL 17), pp. 7-8; Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 13, 1776, Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson (Julian P. Boyd, ed., Princeton, 1950), 1,492; Hicks, Consideration (JHL 
18) p. 2; James Wilson, Considerations on the . .. Authority of the British Parliament (Phila-
delphia, 1774: JHL Pamphlet 44), p.12; Adams, Dissertation, in Works, III, 451). 
140. BAIL YN, supra note 5, at 79-80. 
The colonists ... looked ahead with anxiety rather. than with confidence, for they 
knew, from the whole of their received tradition, of the desperate plight of liberty 
everywhere: "new tyrannies have sprung up, like so many new plagues, within the 
memory of man, and ... [have] engrossed almost the whole earth," rendering "the 
world a slaughterhouse." Rulers of the East were "almost universally absolute ty-
rants .... The states of Africa are scenes of tyranny, barbarity, confusion, and every 
form of violence. And even in Europe, where human nature and society are arrived 
at the highest improvements, where can we find a weJl constituted government or a 
well governed people? France 'has an arbitrary authority'; Prussia, 'an absolute 
government'; Sweden and Denmark 'have sold or betrayed their liberties'; Rome 
'groans under a medley of civil and ecclesiastical bondage'; Germany 'is a hundred-
headed hydra'; and Poland a ruin of 'extravagant licentiousness and anarchy ... the 
nobility and gentry arbitrary despotic tyrants, and the populace a race of slaves.'" 
Only in Britain-and her colonies-had liberty emerged from its trials in tact; only 
in Britain had the battle repeatedly been won. Yet even in Britain the margin of vic-
tory had been narrow, especially in the last, bitter struggle with would-be despots of 
the house of Stuart. And the dangers were known to persist. 
[d. at 79-80. (alteration in original) (citing Cato's Letters, no. 73; New York Gazette: or, The 
Weekly Post Boy, November I, 1756, (quoting at length "a survey of the kingdoms of the 
earth" that appeared in the eleventh essay by "Virginia-Centinel," originally published in the 
Virginia Gazette in September or October, 1756.)) For an almost identical account see the 
New York Mercury, May 22, 1758. 
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ica. ",141 The colonists' conception of threats to liberty throughout re-
cent history therefore "was a matter of great importance... not 
merely because it illustrated the characteristic dangers liberty faced 
but also because it made clear their own special role in history.,,142 
Revolutionary-era Americans themselves were aware that a for-
tuitous confluence of events had placed them at a unique crossroads 
in history, to the point where by 1776 "Americans had come to think 
of themselves as in a special category, uniquely placed by history to 
capitalize on, to complete and fulfill, the promise of man's exis-
tence.,,143 As John Adams put it in his diary, "The liberties of man-
kind and the glory of human nature is in their keeping. . .. America 
was designed by Providence for the theatre on which man was to 
make his true figure, on which science, virtue, liberty, happiness, and 
glory were to exist in peace."l44 
The view of America as a kind of unique Petri dish in time was 
shared by others outside of the colonies as well: 
European illuminati continued to identify America, as John Locke 
had done, with something approximating a benign state of nature 
and to think of the colonies as special preserves of virtue and lib-
erty .... No less a figure than Voltaire stated [in 1734] that Amer-
ica was the refinement of all that was good in England, writing in 
his Lettres philosophiques that Penn and the Quakers had actually 
brought into existence "that golden age of which men talk so much 
and which ,Erobab1y has never existed anywhere except in Penn-
sylvania.,,1 . 
Over a period of a century and a half [before the founding], Amer-
ica became accustomed to the idea that government existed by 
consent of the governed, that the people created the government, 
that they did so by written compact, that the compact reserved 
their natural rights, and that it constituted a fundamental law to 
which the government was subordinate. Constitutionalism, or the 
theory of limited government, was in part an outgrowth of [this] 
social compact. ... To Americans, however, Parliament had ir-
141. BAIL YN, supra note 5 at 82-83. 
142. [d. at 80. "[T]he settlers of America had emigrated to create in a new land civil and 
ecclesiastical governments purer, freer than those they had left behind. The transplantation 
had been made from an undefiled branch of the nation, strong, healthy, brimming with the 
juices ofliberty, and it had been placed in a soil perfect for its growth. In the colonies, 'sought 
and settled as an asylum for liberty, civil and religious' ... " [d. at 83. 
143. [d. at 20. 
144. [d. (quoting John Adams, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 1,282). 
145. BAIL YN, supra note 5, at 83-84. 
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revocably limited itself [in order to protect individual liberties] by 
reaffirmations of the Magna Carta and passage of the Petition of 
Right of 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Bill of Rights 
of 1689, and the Toleration Act of 1689. Americans learned that a 
free people are those who live under a government so constitution-
ally checked and controlled that its powers must be reasonably ex-
ercised without abridging individual rights. 146 
165 
"A half-century before John Locke's Second Treatise on Gov-
ernment, Thomas Hooker of Connecticut expounded the social com-
pact theory,,,147 and one hundred years before the Declaration of In-
dependence, the 'Pennsylvania "Charter of Fundamental Laws of West 
New Jersey (1677), which was probably the work of William 
Penn ... began with the provision that the 'common law or funda-
mental rights' of the colon[ists] should be 'the foundation of the gov-
ernment, which is not to be altered by the Legislative authority. ",148 
This was a significant expansion over the protections offered in 
Mother England, where the "liberty documents ... limited only the 
crown, not the legislature." 
"The Virginia constitution of 1776, the first permanent state con-
stitution, began with a Declaration of Rights that restrained all 
branches of government. . . [and further specified that] 'all men' are 
equally free and have inherent rights that cannot be divested even by 
compact; that among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty, 
and property and the pursuit of happiness; and that all power derives 
from the people, who retain a right to change the government if it fails 
to secure its objectives.,,149 
The political philosophy of the pre-Revolutionary and Revolu-
tionary generations comes through clearly in their writing,150 which 
146. LEVY, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
147. Id. at 3. 
148. Id. at 7. 
149. Id. at 7. 
150. Bailyn writes, 
[T]he leaders of the American Revolution ... turned out ... a rich literature of the-
OIl', argument, opinion and polemic. Every medium of written expression was put 
to use. The newspapers ... were crowded with columns of arguments and counter-
arguments appearing as letters, official documents, extracts of speeches, and ser-
mons. Broadsides-single sheets ... appeared everywhere; they could be found 
posted or passing from hand to hand in the towns of every colony. Almanacs ... 
universally available in the colonies, carried ... a considerable freight of political 
comment. Above all, there were pamphlets: booklets consisting of a few printer's 
sheets, folded in various ways so as to make various sizes and numbers of pages, 
and sold-the pages stitched together loosely, unbound and uncovered. 
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itself was influenced by a wide range of written sources, from the an-
cients,151 the European Enlightenment,152 to English common law-
yers,153 to covenant theology, 154 but "important as all of these clusters 
BAIL YN, supra note 5, at 1-2 (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 
215-16 (New York, 1958); Philip Davidson, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
216-24 (Chapel Hill, 1941)). 
Explanatory as well as declarative, and expressive of the beliefs, attitudes, and mo-
tivations as well as the professed goals of those who led and supported the Revolu-
tion, the pamphlets are the distinctive literature of the Revolution. They reveal, 
more clearly than any other single group of documents, the contemporary meaning 
of that transforming event. 
BAILYN, supra note 5, at 8. 
151. Among the most conspicuous, but often somewhat superficial sources were the clas-
sical authors such as Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Euripides, Herodotus, etc. "It was an obscure 
pamphleteer indeed who could not muster at least one classical analogy or one ancient pre-
cept." Id at 24 (quoting Charles F. Mullett, Classical Influences on the American Revolution, 
CLASSICAL JOURNAL 35, 93-94 (1939-40). Of the classics, 
above all Cicero, Sallust, and Tacitus-writers who had lived either when the repub-
lic was being fundamentally challenged or when its greatest days were already past 
and its moral and political virtues decayed. . .. For the colonists, arguing the 
American cause in the controversies of the 1760's and 1770's, the analogies to their 
own times were compelling .... The classics of the ancient world are everywhere in 
the literature of the Revolution, but they are everywhere illustrative, not determina-
tive, of thought. 
BAILYN, supra note 5, at 25-26. 
152. Bailyn writes, 
More directly influential in shaping the thought of the Revolutionary generation 
were the ideas and attitudes associated with the writings of Enlightenment rational-
ism-writings that expressed not simply the rationalism of liberal reform but that of 
enlightened conservatism as well. . .. The ideas and writings of the leading secular 
thinkers of the European Enlightenment-reformers and social critics like Voltaire, 
Rousseau, and Beccaria as well as conservative analysts like Montesquieu-were 
quoted everywhere in the colonies, by everyone who claimed a broad awareness .... 
Alexander Hamilton, seeking to score points against his venerable antagonist, Sam-
uel Seabury, recommended with arch condescension that his adversary get himself 
at the first opportunity to some of the writings of Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, 
and Bulamaqui to discover the true principles of politics. 
Id at 26-27. All of that said, 
the knowledge they reflect, like that of the ancient classics, is at times superfi-
cial ... ; moreover, everyone, whatever his position on Independence or his judg-
ment of Parliament's actions, cited them as authoritative; almost no one, Whig or 
Tory, disputed them or introduced them with apology. . .. [E]xcept for Locke's, 
their influence, though more decisive than that of the authors of classical antiquity, 
was neither clearly dominant nor wholly determinative. 
Id at 28-30. 
153. "Also prominent and in certain ways powerfully influential was yet another group of 
writers and ideas ... the great figures of England's legal history, especially the seventeenth-
century common lawyers" like Sir Edward Coke; Lord Chief Justices Francis Bacon, Sir Mat-
thew Hale, Sir John Vaughan, and Sir John Holt; and William Blackstone. 
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of ideas were, they did not in themselves form a coherent intellectual 
pattern." 1 55 "What brought these disparate strands of thought to-
gether, what dominated the colonists' miscellaneous learning and 
shaped it into a coherent whole, was the influence of ... the writings 
of a group of prolific [seventeenth century English] opposition theo-
rists,,,156 as then modified, enlarged and fused into a whole by a group 
of early eighteenth-century writers-writers who were essentially 
"coffeehouse radicals and opposition politicians, spokesmen for the 
anti-Court independents within Parliament and the disaffected with-
The common law was manifestly influential in shaping the awareness [and serving 
as a repository of history and human dealings] of the Revolutionary generation .. . 
[indeed, it] stood side by side with Enlightenment rationalism in [their] minds ... . 
But again, it did not in itself determine the kinds of conclusions men would draw in 
the crisis of the time. 
Id. at 30-31. 
154. Another, 
major source of ideas and attitudes of the Revolutionary generation stemmed ulti-
mately from the political and social theories of New England Puritanism, and par-
ticularly from the ideas associated with covenant theology. . .. In one sense this 
was the most limited and parochial tradition ... [in that it was] restricted in its ap-
peal to those who continued to understand the world, as the original Puritans had, in 
theological terms. But in another [ironic] sense it contained the broadest ideas of 
all, since it offered a context for everyday events nothing less than cosmic in its di-
mensions. . .. [It was] found everywhere in the eighteenth-centruy colonies, [and] 
stimulated confidence in the idea that America had a special place, as yet not fully 
revealed, in the architecture of God's intent. 
Id. at 32-33. 
155. Bailyn writes, 
There were among them, in fact, striking incongruities and contradictions. The 
[English] common lawyers the colonists cited, for example, sought to establish right 
by appeal to precedent and to an unbroken tradition evolving from time immemo-
rial, and they assumed ... inherited custom, contained within it a greater wisdom 
than any man or group of men could devise by the power of reason. Nothing could 
have been more alien to the Enlightenment rationalists whom the colonists also 
quoted-and with equal enthusiasm. These theorists felt that it was precisely the 
heavy crust of custom that was weighing down the spirit of man; they sought to 
throw it off and to create by the unfettered power of reason a framework of institu-
tions superior to the accidental inheritance of the past. 
BAILYN, supra note 5, at 33-34. 
156. Prolific writers, these: 
"country" politicians and publicists. .. [were] united in criticism of "court" and 
ministerial power ... [and included among their numbers] John Milton, author of 
Eikonoklastes and The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (both published in 
1649) ... the like-minded Henry Neville; [and,] above all ... the doctrines of Al-
gernon Sidney, that "martyr to civil liberty," whose Discourses Concerning Gov-
ernment (1698) became, in Caroline Robbins' phrase, a "textbook of revolution" in 
America. 
Id. at 34-35 (citations omitted). 
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out. . .. [This group] faded subsequently into obscurity and are little 
known today. But more than any other single group of writers they 
shaped the mind of the American Revolutionary generation.,,157 
The most influential of these "intellectual middlemen [to the 
colonists] were those spokesmen for extreme libertarianism, John 
Trenchard (1662-1723) and Thomas Gordon (d.1750).,,158 Together 
with the treatises of John Locke,159 the writings of Trenchard and 
Gordon "ranked [to the colonists] ... as the most authoritative state-
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 34-35. Trenchard and Gordon, 
joined forces to produce, first, the weekly Independent Whig to attack High Church 
pretensions and, more generally, the establishment of religion, fifty-three papers of 
which were published in book form in 1721; and Cato's Letters, a searing indict-
ment of eighteenth-century English politics and society ... which appeared first se-
rially in The London Journal and then, beginning in 1720, in book form . . .. 
[T]hese libertarian tracts ... left an indelible imprint on the "country" mind every-
where in the English-speaking world. In America, they were republished entire or 
in part again and again, "quoted in every colonial newspaper from Boston to Savan-
nah," and referred to repeatedly in the pamphlet literature. 
Id. at 36. The ideas forwarded by Trenchard and Gordon-ideas "based on extreme solicitude 
for the individual and an equal hostility to government, were expressed in a spirit of forebod-
ing and fear for the future." Id. at 48. 
159. Bailyn writes, 
In Locke's formulation, natural law dictates that man is subject to divine impera-
tives to live in certain ways, but, within the limits set by the law of nature, men can 
act in a godlike fashion. Man as maker has a maker's knowledge of his intentional 
actions, and a natural right to dominion over man's products. Provided we do not 
violate natural law, we stand in the same relation to the objects we create as God 
stands to us; we own them just as he owns us. 
BAILYN, supra note 5, at 48 (citing John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Book II, Chapter 27 and Book I, Chapter 30; JAMES TuLLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: 
JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES, 108-10, 121 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980»; see also Levy, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that for the founders, "the predominance of 
[Lockean] social compact theory reflected a condition of freedom and, like the experience with 
charters, contributed to the belief in written bills of rights"). Shapiro sums up, 
Natural law, or God's natural right, thus sets outer boundaries to a field within 
which humans have divine authority to act as miniature gods, creating rights and ob-
ligations of their own. . .. [Locke insisted] that God speaks directly to every indi-
vidual who reads the Scriptures, and that no human authority is entitled to declare 
one interpretation authoritative in the face of a conflicting one. This freedom to 
comprehend natural law by one's own lights supplied the basis of Locke's right to 
resist that could be invoked against the sovereign, and to which he himself appealed 
when opposing the English crown during the 1680s. His conviction that right an-
swers can be discovered about the meaning of the Scriptures, and, hence, what natu-
ral law requires, was not understood to obliterate human freedom to disagree even 
about that very subject. 
SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 15-17 (citing JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1986». 
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ment of the nature of political liberty and above Locke as an exposi-
tion of the social sources of the threats it faced.,,160 "Standing with 
Trenchard and Gordon as early eighteenth-century 'preceptors of lib-
erty' was the liberal Anglican bishop, Benjamin Hoadly[, the] 'best 
hated clergyman of the century amongst his own order,' ... [who] 
was widely held to be one of the notable figures in the history of po-
litical thought.,,161 
In short, "[0 ]pposition thought, in the form it acquired at the tum 
of the seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth century, was 
devoured by the colonists. From the earliest years of the century it 
nourished their political thought and sensibilities .. " By 1728, in 
fact, Cato 's Letters had already been fused with Locke, Coke, Pufen-
dorf, and Grotius to produce a prototypical American treatise in de-
fense of English liberties overseas, a tract indistinguishable from any 
number of publications that would appear in the Revolutionary crisis 
fifty years later.,,162 "Testimonies to the unique influence of this op-
160. BAIL YN, supra note 5, at 36. 
161. Bailyn writes, 
For illustrations of the way Hoadly's ideas entered into the mainstream of American 
Revolutionary thought, see Jonathan Mayhew's Discourse Concerning Unlimited 
Submission (Boston, 1750: JHL Pamphlet I). . .. Similarly, an anonymous English 
writer at the end of the century attributed the origins of the French Revolution to the 
fact that "every class of Frenchman ... became familiarly acquainted with Sidney, 
Locke, and Hoadly." An Historical View of the French Revolution . ... (Newcastle 
upon Tyne, 1796), p. 18. 
Id. at 37-38. 
With Hoadly, among his contemporaries, though below him in importance to the 
Americans, was the outstanding opponent in Parliament of [Robert] Walpole's ad-
ministration, the leader of a coterie of early eighteenth-century freethinking Whigs, 
Robert Viscount Molesworth. Friend of Trenchard and Gordon, encomiast of 
Cato's Letters (they were frequently attributed to him), he was known particularly 
in the colonies for his Account of Denmark (1694), which detailed the process by 
which free states succumb to absolutism. An opposition leader of another sort who 
contributed in a more complicated way to the colonists' inheritance of early eight-
eenth-century thought was the spectacular Jacobite politician, writer, and philoso-
pher, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke. His Craftsman, appearing weekly or 
semiweekly for a full ten years, from 1726 to 1736, roasted Walpole's administra-
tion in crackling fires of ridicule and denunciation ... and decried the corruption of 
. the age and warned of the dangers of incipient autocracy . .. [A ]mong the many 
Whig historians the Americans knew and referred to ... their preference was for the 
exiled Huguenot, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras ... [whose works,] published in English 
between 17[ 17] and 1731 ... provided indisputable proof of the theories of all of 
the radical and anti-establishment writers by demonstrating their validity through a 
thousand years of English history. 
Id. at 41-42. (citations omitted). 
162. Id. at 43 (citing DANIEL DULANY, SR., THE RIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS OF 
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position literature ... are everywhere in the writings of eighteenth-
century America.,,163 "Above all, their influence may be seen in the 
way the peculiar bent of mind of the writers in this tradition was re-
flected in the ideas and attitudes of the Americans . . .. "Their key 
concepts-natural rights, the contractual basis of society and govern-
ment, the uniqueness of England's liberty-preserving 'mixed' consti-
tution-were commonplaces of the liberal thought of the time. 164 But 
if the elements of their thought were ordinary, the emphasis placed 
upon them and the use made of them was not.,,165 
Revolutionary-era lawyer John Dickinson epitomized these 
commonly-held views of the day, writing: "[Natural rights] are cre-
ated in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of 
our nature. They are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken 
from us by any human power without taking our lives. In short, they 
are founded on the immutable maxims of reason and justice. . .. The 
natural absolute personal rights of individuals are ... the very basis of 
all municipal laws of any great value. [Indeed,] Magna Carta itself is 
in substance but a constrained declaration, or proclamation and prom-
ulgation in the name of King, Lords, and Commons of the sense the 
latter had of their original, inherent, indefeasible, natural rights.,,166 
MARYLAND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ENGLISH LAWS (1728), reprinted in ST. GEORGE L. 
SIOUSSAT, THE ENGLISH STATUTES IN MARYLAND (Baltimore 1903)). 
Id. 
163. Id. at 44-45. Bailyn writes, 
Sometimes they are explicit, as when Jonathan Mayhew wrote that, having been 
"initiated, in youth, in the doctrines of civil liberty, as they were taught by such 
men ... as Sidney and Milton, Locke, and Hoadly, among the modems, I liked 
them; they seemed rational"; or when John Adams insisted, against what he took to 
be the massed opinion of informed Englishmen, that the root principles of good 
government could be found only in "Sidney, Harringon, Locke, Milton, Nedham, 
Nevill, Burnet, and Hoadly"; or again, when he listed the great political thinkers of 
1688 as "Sidney, Locke, Hoadly, Trenchard, Gordon, Plato Redivivus [Neville]." 
More often, the evidence is implicit, in the degree to which the pamphleteers quoted 
from, plagiarized, and modeled their writings on Cato's Letters and The Independ-
ent Whig. 
164. Id. at 45. 
165. Id. at 44-45. For example, "John Adams professed to have read through five times 
[Bolingbroke's Works]." Id. at 39 n.22. 
166. Id. at 77-78 (quoting "[John Dickinson], An Address to the Cornmittee of Corre-
spondence in Barbados .... (Philadelphia, 1766), in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of John 
Dickinson (Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, XlV, Philadelphia, 1895), 
p.262) .... " Id. at 78 n.22. See also Levy, supra note 2, at 3. Bailyn notes that Dickinson 
reflects the prevailing view among the colonists was that "[ s ]uch God-given, natural, inalien-
able rights, distilled from reason and justice through the social and governmental compacts, 
were expressed in the cornmon law of England, in the statutory enactments of Parliament, and 
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The mere seven decades between the birth of the federal consti-
tutional democracy in 1789 and the onset of the Civil War in 1861 
saw a sea-change in attitude regarding the nature of the governmental 
threat to individual liberty. As noted by Professor Amar, in the 1780s 
the states were regarded as benign; indeed, they were regarded as pro-
tectors against a threatening national government. 167 As we have 
seen, "[i]n light of their experience with imperial arrogance and op-
pression on the one hand, and the heroic roles played by local gov-
ernments in resisting oppression on the other, many Americans in the 
1780s associated strong central government with tyranny and a strong 
state government with freedom.,,168 But after the tum of the century, 
"it would be hard to argue that the central government acted qualita-
tively more repressively than local ones.,,169 "The structural impera-
tives of the peculiar institution [of slavery] led slave states to violate 
virtually every right and freedom declared in the Bill-not just the 
rights and freedoms of slaves, but of free men and women toO.,,170 
in the charters of privileges promulgated by the crown." BAIL YN, supra note 5 at 77-78. 
167. AMAR, supra note 7, at 159 (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REpUBLIC 24-25, 60-61, 362 (1776-1787) (1969); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104 (1991); citing also Del. Declaration of 
Rights of 1776, art. 6 ("the right of the people to participate in the Legislature, is the founda-
tion of liberty and of all free government"); Md. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), art. 
V). 
Jd. 
168. Jd. at 158. 
The American Revolution had featured local colonies fighting an imperial center in 
the name of both freedom and federalism. . .. This association was of course 
strengthened by the events in the following decade, with the Virginia and Kentucky 
legislatures [ghostwritten by Madison and Jefferson, respectively] leading the 
charge against the federal Sedition Act. 
169. Jd. at 159. No issue: 
place[ d] the libertarian track record of federal versus state governments in stronger 
light than did slavery. And on this question, states did not shine. Slavery was al-
most exclusively a creature of state law. . .. [A] major platform of the Free Soil 
and Republican Parties in the 1840s and 1850s was that the Constitution frowned on 
federal involvement with slavery. Freedom was national, slavery local-hence the 
popular slogan, "Freedom National," a slogan that would have sounded quite odd in 
the 1780s and 1790s. 
Jd. at 160 (citing, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1968,5 (Kirk H. Porter and Donald 
Bruce Johnson eds., 3d. 1966) (Liberty Platform of 1844, sec. 10, 11); ERIC FONER, FREE 
SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 73-102 (1970); HAROLD M. HYMAN AND WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, EQUALJUSTICE UNDER LAW 17-18, 92-93, 170 (1982». 
170. Jd. at 160 (citing e.g., CURTIS, supra note 7 at 36; WILLIAM GOODELL, THE 
AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 372-84 (Negro Universities Press, 1968) 
(1853); TENBROEK, infra note 174, at 38-39,125-26; H. HYMAN and W. WIECEK, supra note 
169 at 15, 182-83, 280"81, 401-02) "Slavery bred repression." !d. at 280-81 (citing CONGo 
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Add to the slave states' abuses the Court's narrow textual inter-
pretation in the 1833 case, Barron v. Baltimore l71 that the Bill of 
Rights applies only to Congress, not the states, and you have a ready 
source of conflict between the prevailing judicial doctrine of the day 
and the founders' original position that the Constitution protects natu-
ral individual liberties. 172 "To a nineteenth-century believer in natural 
rights,173 the Bill was not simply an enactment of We the People as 
the Sovereign Legislature bringing new legal rights into existence, but 
rather a declaratory judgment by We the People as the Sovereign 
High Court that certain natural or fundamental rights already ex-
isted.,,174 Barron failed to reflect this view. 
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 2595-2602 (1860) (remarks of Sen. Charles Sumner); Michael 
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech. 
Slavery. and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment. 68 
CHJ.-KENT L. REv. liB, 1127, 1132 (1993». "Speech and writing critical of slavery, even if 
plainly religious or political in inspiration, was incendiary and had to be suppressed in south-
ern states, lest slaves overhear and get ideas." Id. (citing CURTIS, supra note 7 at 23, 30-38; 
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 211-12 (1956); Alfred Avins, Incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited. 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 17-
26 (1968); CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH 
(1964); RUSSELL B. NYE, FEITERED FREEDOM (1963». "In 1859 a Virginia postmaster even 
banned the New York Tribune, a leading Republican newspaper, under a sweeping state cen-
sorship statute; twenty years earlier, the state had tried to prosecute citizens for circulating an 
antislavery petition to Congress." AMAR, supra note 7, at 160-61 (citing CURTIS). Quite a fall 
indeed in a few short decades for the proud state of Virginia, home of Washington, Jefferson, 
and Madison. "Teaching slaves to read (even the Bible) was a criminal offense punished se-
verely in some states." Id. at 161 (citing e.g., CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1013 (1866) 
(remarks of Rep. Tobias Plants); K. STAMPP, supra, at 208, 22; TENBROEK, supra, at 124-25). 
"[I]n at least one state, writing, printing, publishing, or distributing abolitionist literature was 
punishable by death." Id. (citing Kurt. T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise 
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106, 
1134, 1134 n.127 (1994». 
171. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
172. In failing to honor the founders' views regarding individual liberties as inviolable 
natural law, Barron's underlying message was that Bill of Rights provisions such as the First 
Amendment were "merely an interpretation of the positive-law code of the original Constitu-
tion, declaring that Congress lacked Article I, section 8-enumerated power to regulate religion 
in the states or to suppress speech." AMAR, supra note 7, at 148-49. 
173. Following Barron, it was left to lawyers practicing "the common-law method in 
mid-nineteenth-century America ... [to find that] even if the federal Bill of Rights did not, 
strictly speaking, bind the states of its own legislative force ... [it was] at least declaratory of 
certain fundamental common-law rights ... " Id. at 147. 
174. Id. at 148 (citing, e.g .. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 90-91,128 (Col-
lier, 1965) (1951) ("[e]arly amendments [were] seen by [Barron] contrarians as 'declaratory 
constitutional safeguards of natural rights' and 'a meeting ground of constitutional and natural 
rights"'); Howard Jay Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 
3, 3-4 (1954) (noting centrality of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of various 
constitutional provisions as 'declaratory'); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
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The philosophical debate concerning the constitutional interplay 
of state and federal government with protection of natural individual 
liberties that took place in the first half of the nineteenth century set 
the stage after the Civil War for the Fourteenth Amendment's memo-
rialization of the notion that the Constitution incorporates the Bill of 
Rights to apply to the states175 and implicitly protects natural rights. 
During the debate in the thirty-ninth Congress over the language for 
what became the Fourteenth Amendment, Section l's principal 
draftsman John Bingham "made himself abundantly clear. Over and 
over he described the privileges-or-immunities clause as encompass-
ing 'the bill of rights '-a phrase he used more than a dozen times in a 
key speech on February 28.,,176 Moreover, when asked again several 
AMENDMENT 59 (1988) (quoting 1867 Pennsylvania legislator who described constitutional 
amendments as submitted to the people "'sitting as a jury-that is, a judicial body"); I 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42,53-55,57-58,86; BAILYN, supra note 5, at 69, 
n.13, 78, 187-98 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBLIC, 
1776-1787,294 (1969); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1127, 1132-33 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 
171 (1992). State courts, through these approaches, saw their way clear to imposing principles 
distilled from the Bill of Rights within their own jurisdictions. AMAR, supra note 7, at 149-51 
(citing Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 340 (1857) ("[T]he amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States, in the nature of a bill of rights, [should be regarded] as the an-
nunciation of great and fundamental principles, to be always held in regard, both morally and 
legally, by those who make and those who administer the law [rather than as mere] precise and 
positive directions and rules of action. "); Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 
165-68 (N. Y. 1816) (applying ''just compensation" requirement despite absence of state man-
date "after canvassing the 'soundest authorities' of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Blackstone, and 
the express language of [several neighboring states'] constitutions, [the judge] proclaimed: 
'But what is of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive of the sense of the people of this 
country, [the principle] is made a part of the Constitution of the United States"). 
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court (ironically, given the antebellum era) was a leader in 
enunciating natural law: "The Bill of Rights' purpose 'was to declare to the world the fixed 
and unalterable determination of our people, that these invaluable rights ... should never be 
disturbed by any government.' The Bill was' our American Magna Carta. ", [d. at 155 (quot-
ing Campbell v. State, II Ga. 353, 367-68 (1852)). 
175. The northern Republicans' disapproval of the southern states' practice of disarming 
of blacks in the South, as discussed in the debates over the Act, "fed the determination of 
northern Republicans to provide national enforcement of the Bill of Rights." It is fair to say 
that "[t]he efforts to disarm the freedmen were in the background when the 39th Congress de-
bated the Fourteenth Amendment .... " ROBERT J. COTTROL & RAYMOND T. DIAMOND, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT: TOWARD AN AFRO-AMERICANIST RECONSIDERATION (1991), Re-
printed in GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 345-46 (Paul Finkelman ed. Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993). 
176. AMAR, supra note 7, at 182 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-94 
(1866)). In this speech "he also explained why a constitutional amendment was necessary, 
citing by name and quoting from the Supreme Court's opinions in Barron and one of its prog-
eny, LiVingston V. Moore." [d. (citing CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at \089-90). "The 
day before, a colleague of Bingham's, Robert Hale, had suggested that states were already 
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years later after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
1871, to clarify the amendment, "here, too, he immediately linked 
'the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States' with 
the Bill of Rights: "[T]he privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are 
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States. Those eight amendments are as follows. [Bingham 
then proceeded to read the first eight amendments word for word.] 
These eight articles I have shown never were limitations upon the 
power of the States, until made so by the Fourteenth Amendment."l77 
bound by the Bill of Rights." Id. (citing CONGo GLOBE, 39th Congo 1st Sess. at 1064), but Bing-
ham set Hale and others straight with the following quotation from Livingston: 'As to the 
amendments of the Constitution of the United States, they must be put out of the case, since it 
is now settled that those amendments do not extend to the States ... .' Id. at 182-83 (citing 
CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1090 (quoting Livingston V. Moore, 32 U.S., (7 Pet.) 
469,551-52 (1833)). "Six weeks later Bingham again held forth on the need for his amend-
ment, invoking 'the bill of rights' six times in a single speech and again reminding his col-
leagues that it 'has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States' that 'the 
bill of rights ... does not limit the powers of States." Id. at 183 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 1291-93). In a speech in January 1867, while the amendment was pending 
in the states, Bingham again reminded his audience that his amendment would overrule Bar-
ron. Id. at 183 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 39m Cong., 2d. Sess. at 811 (1867)). Bingham had ear-
lier stated, in 1859, that "whenever the Constitution guaranties to its citizens a right, either 
natural or conventional, such guarantee is in itself a limitation upon the States." /d. at 181 (cit-
ing CONGo GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. at 982 (1859). Moreover, "no state could violate the 
Constitution's 'wise and beneficent guarantees of political rights to the citizens of the United 
States, as such, and of natural rights to all persons, whether citizens or strangers. ", Id. at 182 
(citing CONGo GLOBE, 35 th Cong., 2d Sess. at 983). 
177. AMAR, supra note 7, at 183 (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. 
(1871)). Thaddeus Stevens, political leader of the House and head of the House delegation of 
the Committee on Reconstruction that officially reported the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: 
shortly before the amendment came before the House for final approval .... "I can 
hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every one of 
these provisions [in section I of the Fourteenth Amendment] is just. . .. But the 
Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. 
This amendment supplies that defect." 
/d. at 185 (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)). Two years earlier, in 
1864, 
Representative James Wilson had made clear that he too understood the "privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States" to include the guarantee of the 
amendments ... "Freedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press, and 
the right of assemblage for the purpose of petition belong to every American citi-
zen. . .. With these rights no State may interfere. . .. Sir I might enumerate many 
other constitutional rights of the citizen which slavery has disregarded and practi-
cally destroyed, but I have [said] enough to illustrate my proposition: that slav-
ery ... denies to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens." 
Id. at 184-85 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864)); Representative Hale 
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But the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause 
encompassed more than just the Bill of Rights-indeed, it was in-
tended to provide constitutional cover for a full range of natural indi-
vidual liberties, which had been neglected and abused between the 
time of founding and the Civil War (but this time mostly by state, 
rather than federal, govemment).178 This was in Reconstruction-era 
Americans' keeping, much like their Revolutionary-era ancestors, 
with the core belief in the existence of "absolute rights inherent in the 
people ... of which no power can legally deprive them ... principles 
which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty, and are most inti-
stating: 
[T]hese amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten ... constitute 
the bill of rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defining and 
limiting the power of Federal and State legislation .... [T]here is much force in the 
reasoning that there has been from first to last, a violation of the provisions in this 
bill of rights by the very existence of slavery itself. 
CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064-65 (1866). In the Senate, head of the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction Jacob Howard commented, "The great object of the first section of this 
[fourteenth] amendment is ... to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times 
to respect these great fundamental [bill of rights] guarantees." AMAR, supra note 7, at 186 
(quoting CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866)). Amar notes further that "the 
leading scholarly work counts no fewer than thirty Republican statements in the Thirty-eighth 
and Thirty-ninth Congresses voicing [ similar] contrarian sentiments, and not one supporting 
Barron." Id. at 186 (citing MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 112 (1986)). The comments of all of 
the Congressmen cited received broad media and public attention, yet 
not a single person in either house spoke up to deny these men's interpretation of 
section l. Surely, if the words of section I meant something different, this was the 
time to stand up and say so. Consider, finally, that all of these men offered glosses 
that mesh perfectly with each other and, most importantly, with the plain meaning 
of the words of section l. 
Id. at 187. As Amar notes, "In light of all of this, it is [indeed] astonishing that some scholars, 
most notably Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, have suggested that when Bingham invoked 
'the bill of rights,' he didn't mean what he said." Id. at 183 (citing Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 26, 33-34, 134, 136 
(1949); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 141-42 (1977); Raoul Berger, Incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 
435,463 (1981)). "For a powerful rebuttal to the general claims of Berger's article, see Mi-
chael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on 
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982))." [d. 
178. The Bill of Rights in its entirety serves to enumerate only a portion of those funda-
mental "rights," "liberties," "privileges," and "immunities" that the Fourteenth Amendment 
framers in the thirty-ninth Congress intended to incorporate to apply to the states. The reason 
the framers did not simply state clearly that the entire Bill of Rights was incorporated, Bing-
ham says, was because they intended also to include other important freedoms found in the 
Constitution outside of the Bill of Rights, such as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
found in Article I, Section 9. See, e.g., Amar, Akhil Reed, The Original Meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 443 (1996). 
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mately connected with the dearest rights of the people. . .. [These 
p ]rinciples ... deserve to be diligently taught to our children, and to 
be written upon the posts. of the houses, and upon the gates.,,179 
With the constitutional complement now in place after Recon-
struction, fast forward to the America of the early twenty-first cen-
turyI8°-where oppressive amendments discriminating against same-
sex couples are passed in all thirteen states where the question is on 
179. AMAR, supra note 7, at 153 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 
555-57 (1840) (C.P. VanNess argument». Abolitionists and Republicans in the post-Civil 
War Congress viewed the Reconstruction Amendments as having an even more vital purpose: 
"In short, the Reconstruction Amendments would be interpreted as embodying the spiritual 
and moral principles undermined by the original Constitution." Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, 
The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness and Colorblindedness in 
Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REv. 483, 496 (2003). Professor Magee Andrews contin-
ues, 
the historical record suggests that the framers of radical abolitionist constitutional-
ism, whose ideas would ultimately create the basis of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment-men like Frederick Douglass, Charles Olcott, James Birney (a re-
formed ex-slaveholder himself), and Alvan Stewart [-as well as "other well-known 
intellectuals of the day, such as Emerson and Thoreau"-] looked toward a world 
which, in the century following the end of slavery, would be truly transformed ... 
[and] imagined a world in which, in the first instance, humanity would be highly 
valued, supported, and protected by the state .... [F]or many, the debasement of 
moral principle represented by the Constitution's sanction of slavery undermined 
the spiritual foundation of the new country: It broke the country's spirit. It follows, 
then, that the constitutional codification of our commitment to abolition would be 
seen as giving back what the slavery compromises took away: they were to mend 
the country's spirit. 
Id at 501 (citing FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE, WRITIEN BY HIMSELF 43-
45,296, 66-72 (Signet 1st ed., 1968». 
180. Regarding the peoples' trust in state as opposed to federal government, Professor 
Gardner suggests, "[t]rust in state governments enjoyed a resurgence during the late Nine-
teenth Century, particularly after public opinion turned against the northern occupation of the 
South and the Union programs of Reconstruction." Gardner, supra note 45, at 1009 (citing 
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 582 
(1988); FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 
1776-1876208-21 (2000); MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 477 (2002». "The Progressive reform 
movement of the early Twentieth Century, followed quickly by the Great Depression, two 
world wars, and the Civil Rights Movement, set the nation on a path in which national power 
was typically far more respected and trusted than state power." ld (citing Keith E. Whitting-
ton, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,500-03 (1998». "By the 1980s, however, resentment against na-
tional power seemed to rise once again." Id at 503-22. Today, we may well live in an age in 
which the people are as close to true indifference between national and state power as they 
have ever been, and are willing to contemplate the exercise of power by either level of gov-
ernment, depending upon which level can more persuasively demonstrate that it can do the 
better job. !d. at 1010 (citing Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, 
N.Y. TIMES, at 4: 14, Sept. 30,2001). 
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the ballot; where compassionate end-of-life choice is illegal in 49 
states and where the one state where it is legal is being sued by the 
U.S. government asking the Supreme Court to declare the state law 
unlawful; where hundreds of thousands are criminally arrested annu-
ally (about 734,000 per year) and tens of thousands are in prison for 
possessing or using marijuana and the federal government success-
fully sues to prevent a state from allowing the compassionate medical 
use of marijuana; where a woman's right to maintain control over her 
own reproductive decisions hangs by a thread; and where religious 
freedom is under relentless attack. How did this happen? That the 
privileges and immunities clause was strangled in its crib by the Court 
in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases opinion, 181 thus withholding from 
the judiciary a valuable tool for the protection of individual liberties 
for the following 125 years, certainly did not help matters; but more 
generally Americans themselves have not been vigilant enough in 
protecting their natural freedom of autonomy from a "wholly new 
species of oppression . . . [where] the democratic government, acting 
in response to the will of the majority ... create[ s] a society with a 
network of ... [rules] that none can escape.,,182 Now is the time for 
change. 
D. Reviving Freedom of Autonomy 
Professor Elizabeth Price Foley writes, "Instead of a land of in-
dividualliberty and ... tolerance, America has become a land of pub-
lic morality and intolerance, all without the benefit of constitutional 
amendment. " [and w]hile there is nothing wrong with having an 
opinion based upon one's culture or religion, there is something 
wrong with imposing this opinion upon others in a pluralistic society 
founded upon individualliberty.,,183 
181. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment privileges 
and immunities clause refers only to the limited rights of "federal" citizenship, not to the more 
expansive rights of "state" citizenship). See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 38. 
182. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
183. FOLEY, ELIZABETH PRICE, LIBERTY FOR ALL: PRIVACY VERSUS MORALITY IN THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming Yale Press 2006) (manuscript at 62, 67-68, on file 
with author). Foley systematically describes how conventional or traditional governmental 
approaches to various cultural institutions and customs (for example, marriage, reproductive 
freedom, religion, etc.) deny specific fundamental liberties, and in so doing proves her point 
that "Americans have long forgotten the foundational constitutional principles of limited gov-
ernment and residual individual liberty" (manuscript at 26). 
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That's the problem in a nutshell. It would be one thing had 
American government undertaken to micro-manage our lives and to 
infringe upon our natural rights of freedom of autonomy-rights that 
our forebears identified in the Declaration of Independence 'and saw 
fit to guarantee to us in the Constitution-pursuant to the grant of 
some sort of constitutional authority of its own, but of course there is 
no such grant. Instead, government, as guided by a moralistic and of-
ten intolerant majority, has proceeded to systematically strangle many 
of our basic constitutionally-guaranteed private freedoms, thus turn-
ing our American sea ofliberty into a sea of government authority.184 
Many say this is acceptable. We are, after all, committed mo-
nists say,185 a nation founded on democratic principles-the idea is 
that government obtains the consent of the governed 186 through an 
election process in which citizens elect fellow citizens, who presuma-
bly then represent the interests of all in the process of lawmaking. 187 
If it is the majority's will in the course of its legitimate policymaking 
on matters involving government taxing and spending, etc., also to 
impose limits on the behavior and free will of individuals, then so be 
it. Those who disagree with the policy decisions of the elected repre-
sentatives have recourse every few years at the polling statio'n, so dis-
senters among the oppressed minority should stop whining and live 
184. See supra note 79. 
185. See supra note 28. 
186. It is said that obtaining "consent of the governed" is a necessary, basic element for 
legitimate government: "[C]oherent, stable-and morally supportable-government is possi-
ble only on the basis of consent, and ... the secret of consent is the sense of common venture 
fostered by institutions that reflect and represent us and that we can call to account." 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 20 (Yale 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (dis-
cussing Judge Learned Hand's favoring of democratic institutions and principles over the 
counter-majoritarianism inherent in America's practice of broad judicial review). But see 
BARNETI, supra note 42 for the proposition that true "consent of the governed" is impossible 
to achieve. 
187. Most assuredly, elections are imperfect proxies for the governed and their interests. 
As Professor Bickel surmised, 
It may be, as Professor Robert A. Dahl has written, that elections themselves, and 
the political competition that renders them meaningful, "do not make for govern-
ment by majorities in any very significant way," for they do not establish a great 
many policy preferences. However, "they are crucial devices for controlling lead-
ers. " 
BICKEL, supra note 186 at 18-19 (quoting DAHL, ROBERT A., A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY 125, 132 (1956). Or, as stated by Judge Hand, "Of course I know how illusory would 
be the belief that my vote determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a: 
satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture." Id. (quoting LEARNED 
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958». 
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within the limits that have been imposed upon their freedom. 
Of course to the rights foundationalist l88 this vision is unaccept-
able in a nation founded on principles of freedom and individual lib-
erty. Government, whether guided by democratically-elected majori-
ties or not, simply lacks authority to deprive We the People of natural 
rights of freedom of autonomy on matters of private concern - rights, 
after all, that had been recognized and guaranteed in the nation's 
founding documents--except under the most extreme circumstances. 
Such rigorous protection of rights assuredly is not the status quo m 
America. 
So, America is at a crossroads. Will Americans continue along 
their current path of complacency and allow an ever-greater num-
ber of government prohibitions and restrictions on matters of natu-
ral private concern? Or will they say "Enough!" and take neces-
sary steps to put government back in its proper place? 
If there is to be any hope for improvement, law and policy-makers 
must be reminded, and must begin to give effect once again 
(mostly by simply refraining from acting), to the core political 
theory memorialized in the Declaration and Constitution that 
Americans should be "protect[ ed] in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations . . . [ and their] right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized man ... [and that] to protect that right, every un-
justifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the in-
dividual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation.,,189 Courts, moreover, through the assertive exercise of 
its indispensable power of judicial review,190 must hold law and 
188. See supra note 28. 
189. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
190. The doctrine of judicial review is regarded by some as nothing short of America's 
greatest contribution to constitutional theory. As Professor Bickel puts it, 
Marbury v. Madison. . . exerts an enormous magnetic pull. It is, after all, a great 
historic event, a famous victory; and it constitutes, even more than victories won by 
arms, one of the foundation stones of the Republic. It is hallowed. It is revered. If 
it had a physical presence, like the Alamo or Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attrac-
tion; and the truth is that it very nearly does have and very nearly is. At any rate, 
most of us share, as Thayer said, in the moral approval of the lines. 
BICKEL, supra note 186173, at 74. Commentators are not unanimous in their praise, however: 
"[N]othing ... can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the 
American democracy." ld. at 18. Judge Learned Hand, for one, favored democratic institu-
tions and principles over the counter-majoritarianism inherent in America's practice of broad 
judicial review: "It would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even 
if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss 
the stimulus ofliving in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction 
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policy-makers strictly accountable to upholding the concepts of 
"liberty" and "property" as they were understood in all of their 
broad scope by the founding and Reconstruction generations, who 
believed that the right of individual freedom of autonomy is guar-
anteed squarely within these expansive terms. 191 
Moreover, the Supreme Court should continue along the path 
upon which it embarked in 1999 in Saenz v. Roe, and allow the 
FQurteenth Amendment privileges or immunities clause to fulfill 
its originally-intended and most noble p~ose of righting some of 
the wrongs of the original Constitution19 and of providing more 
complete protection for the individual natural rights of all Ameri-
cans. The historical record convincingly demonstrates what the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress intended for the clause,193 and as is becom-
of public affairs." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). Thayer suggested, more-
over, over 1 00 years ago, that the very intrusiveness of judicial review cannot help but lead to 
a self-fulfilling weakening of the legislature: 
The legislatures are growing accustomed to this distrust and more and more readily 
inclined to justify it, and to shed the considerations of constitutional restraints ... 
turning that subject over to the courts. . .. The people, all this while, become care-
less as to whom they send to the legislature; too often they cheerfully vote for men 
whom they would not trust with an important private affair, and when these unfit 
persons are found to pass foolish and bad laws, and the courts step in and disregard 
them, the people are glad that these few wiser gentlemen on the bench are so ready 
to protect them against their more immediate representatives .. " The tendency of a 
common and easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to 
dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsi-
bility. 
BICKEL, supra note 186, at 21-22 (quoting 1. B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-04, 106-07 
(1901». 
191. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
192. As Professor Rhonda Magee Andrews writes, 
the endorsement of slavery in the Constitution.. . made every American who 
wished to love his or her country complicit in the endorsement of white superiority 
at its origination. At its very founding, then, our country broke the spirit of its high-
est aspirations and made a mockery of American civilization and humanity itself. 
DuBois summarized the implications this way: 
"With the faith of the nation broken at the very outset, the system of slavery un-
touched, and twenty years respite given to the slave-trade to feed and foster it, there 
began, with 1787 ... a moral, political, and economic monstrosity, which makes the 
history of our dealing with slavery ... so discreditable to a great people". . .. [The 
Reconstruction Amendments] would be seen as giving back what the slavery com-
promises took away: they were to mend the country's spirit ... [to] be interpreted as 
embodying the spiritual and moral principles undermined by the original Constitu-
tion. 
Magee Andrews, supra note 179 at 496 (quoting W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1810 198 (1896». 
193. See supra notes 169-70 arid accompanying text. See also LAWRENCE, supra note 
38. 
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ing increasingly clear with the passage of time the Supreme Court 
was just plain wrong in 1873 to deny the privileges or immunities 
clause its proper place in the constitutional firmament. The mis-
take that was the Slaughterhouses Cases should finally be cor-
rected and put to rest. 
181 
As meaningful and positive as these steps would be, they would still be 
second-best when compared to the ideal, though improbable,194 step of a 
constitutional amendment explicitly guaranteeing that the right of freedom 
of autonomy on matters of natural private concem-a right contemplated in 
the Declaration of Independence and guaranteed in the Constitution-shall 
not be abridged by either federal or state govemment. 195 An amendment 
would be best because the fact is that currently the judiciary, dispersed as it 
is throughout the fifty separate states and thirteen federal circuits, is woe-
fully inconsistent in its decision-making on freedom of autonomy matters, so 
an individual's protection from government infringement is highly depend-
ent on the random matter of where the individual lives.196 Moreover, even 
though the historical record does express the framers' original intent to in-
clude the right of freedom of autonomy within the terms "liberty" and 
"property" and "privileges or immunities,,,197 admittedly those terms are suf-
ficiently ambiguous as to be subject to misunderstanding or misinterpreta-
tion by the courts-and so they have been.198 The courts, by failing over 
194. See supra note 39. 
195. The amendment might read, tracking closely the First Amendment's protection of 
speech, "Neither Congress nor any State shall make or enforce any law abridging the freedom 
of individual autonomy on matters of natural private concern." The shift in presumption 
would resolve close questions against the government, much like the analogous First Amend-
ment. 
196. Judicial opinions themselves are all over the board on matters of individual free-
dom. It is not at all unusual, for example, that the newspaper in the course of any few days 
will report on how a court in one jurisdiction has upheld a particular privacy right, while an-
other has struck it down. For example, on one recent day the New York Times had the follow-
ing headlines on the very same front page regarding court opinions on same-sex marriage: 
"Court Upholds Federal Restrictions on Gay Marriage" (describing an opinion of the federal 
court of appeals); and "New York Gay Marriage Allowed." (reporting an opinion of the state 
of New York's highest court). N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005 at AI. More recently on this issue, a 
California court upheld gay marriage in California. Judge strikes down California gay mar-
riage ban, MSNBC, Mar. 14,2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.comlidl7182628/. 
197. See supra notes 47-53, 166-169. 
198. Some of the judiciary's cautious response is understandable---courts, under separa-
tion of powers principles, give deference to coequal branches of government and are properly 
hesitant to strike down their actions except in clear cases. As Jed Rubenfeld writes, 
constitutionalism as democracy is very broadly opposed to judge-made "fundamen-
tal rights" not derivable from any of the nation's written constitutional commit-
ments. Little room for extra-textual constitutional law exists on the model of writ-
ing. But not no room. There are, at the extreme limits of what a democratic 
govemment might try to do with or to its citizens, certain unwritten laws of written 
constitutionalism, and a right of privacy is among them. 
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time to give those words their full intended effect, have effectually institu-
tionalized (but still not memorialized) their lesser meanin~s through opera-
tion of the common law and the doctrine of stare decisis. I The Slaughter-
house Cases' effect on the privileges or immunities clause is the classic case 
in point, where an erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision by 
the Court effectively put the provision out of play for (at least) the following 
130-plus years.200 . 
In short, a constitutional amendment would solve these problems 
by providing much-needed guidance to the judiciary (both state and 
federal) in its exercise of its judicial review function, and also to the 
Rubenfeld, supra note 70 at 223. See supra text accompanying note 70 for Rubenfeld's dis-
cussion of anti-totalitarian right to privacy. 
199. The Supreme Court's privacy cases: 
merely reemphasize the embarrassing sense of artifice, of post-hoc rationalization, 
that has accompanied the right of privacy since the Supreme Court first discerned it 
in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights. . .. Every time such a 
right is posited by a judge (or anyone else), there has to be some extra-textual ac-
count of its constitutional status-some extra-textual account of why this particular 
right counts, even though unwritten, as a constitutional right. And such an account 
has to answer to all the demands of legitimacy imposed by constitutionalism as de-
mocracy when unelected judges render constitutional decisions for the nation. 
RUBENFELD, supra note 70, at 222-23. 
200. When this "most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known," 
BICKEL, supra note 186, at I, does slip up-- and it does all-too-frequently-the effects can be 
devastating to the individual rights of millions for many years or even decades. For example, 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that slaves were considered as 
"property," not "citizens," under the Constitution) played a major role in precipitating the Civil 
War; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that majority-driven "separate but 
equal" laws in the states did not violate the equal protection rights of the black racial minority) 
authorized Jim Crow discrimination of racial minorities for another sixty years; and Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) allowed the forced relocation of many thousands of in-
nocent U.S. citizens of Japanese-American descent into interrunent camps during World War 
II. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.s. 98 (2000), with its implausible equal protection chimera barely 
masking an underlying political cast, deeply wounded the prestige of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and exposes an Achilles heel in our constitutional system of checks and balances. Specifically, 
the integrity of judicial review relies ultimately on the opinions of nine individuals who have 
reached that exalted station in no small part because [largely as a result] of their superior abil-
ity to negotiate the politics of judicial appointment. As long as the appointment process works 
well enough to maintain a majority of competent Justices who are truly independent and not 
ideologically or politically driven toward a particular viewpoint, we're mostly okay, but with 
the appointment of one or more additional ideologically-driven hard-right conservative Jus-
tices to take the place of retiring Justices in the next several years, this Court has the potential 
to hand down a case that may be judged by history in class together with the earlier three in 
terms of violence done to individual liberties. Is there any doubt that the addition of one or 
two more Justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas would make a difference in how 
the Court decides matters ·of individual liberty affecting tens of millions of citizens like abor-
tion rights (Roe v. Wade and its progeny, including Casey v. Pennsylvania); gay rights and 
sexual privacy rights (Lawrence v. Texas) or, for that matter religious freedom? 
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other all-too-fallible legislative and executive government institutions 
entrusted with protecting individual liberties?OI The intent in enact-
ing such an amendment would be to offer a scope of protection for 
matters of private autonomy similar to that guaranteed in the analo-
gous First Amendment's protection of speech, where, in applying the 
Court's current doctrine, absolute deprivations of freedom of auton-
omy are upheld only in the most extreme of circumstances, and partial 
deprivations only if in line with rigid guidelines. As to the latter, the 
doctrine would apply strict scrutiny if the abridgement of the freedom 
of autonomy is content-based, and intermediate scrutiny if content-
neutral, under which reasonable time, place and manner restrictions 
may be upheld. 
Another advantage of constitutional amendment is that by unam-
biguously re-claiming rights that We the People had at one time 
but then lost somewhere along the way to an overbearing govern-
ment, We adhere firmly to the principle of fidelity to a written 
Constitution, where any adjustment to our understanding of the 
Constitution is memorialized through the Article V amendment 
process. In effect what We the People are doing is changing the 
terms of our consent to be governed by adjusting the terms of the 
"contract"-i.e., the Constitution. If consent of the governed is a 
necessary element of government legitimacy-and it is, under 
modern Enlightenment and social contract theory202-there is no 
other way to alter the terms of that consent than to memorialize the 
change in the underlying Agreement.203 The difference in this 
201. On the importance of the guidance provided in a written constitution, it is useful to 
look back at the original motivations for a constitution at the time of the founding: 
The American colonial experience, climaxed by the controversy with England lead-
ing to the Revolution, honed American sensitivity to the need for written constitu-
tions that protected rights grounded in the "immutable laws of nature" as well as in 
the British constitution and colonial charters. . .. Americans had a novel concept of 
constitution. The word signified to them a supreme law creating government, limit-
ing it, unalterable by it, and paramount to it. . .. "To secure these rights," Thomas 
Jefferson declared, "governments are instituted among men." 
Levy, supra note 2 at 8-9. See also BARNETT, supra note 42 (stating the importance of a con-
stitution to "lock-in" the processes by which those who govern may govern). 
202. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
203. See, e.g., RUBENFELD, supra note 70, at 223 (writing that "[t]he only constitutional 
law binding on a democracy that seeks to be the author of its own fundamental legal and po-
litical commitments is law that derives from the nation's own acts of memorialization . ... 
[There can be very little 1 unenumerated constitutional law in [a system of] constitutionalism as 
democracy ... ). This principle of memorialization thus requires that we must be skeptical of 
arguments that the constitution may be altered by extra-constitutional factors, "moments," or 
otherwise. For example, in Professor Bruce Ackerman's theory of a two-track lawmaking 
system he posits: 
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case is that we're in effect "re-memorializing" something that was 
already memorialized in the first place, but that's okay-if the 
government didn't get it or understand it the first time, there's 
nothing wrong with We the People going back and making the 
point again with more pointed emphasis. 
III. CONCLUSION 
America has fallen far short of the promise made in the Declara-
tion of Independence and Bill of Rights for protecting individual lib-
erties of equality and free choice on matters of natural private con-
cern-rights considered to be natural and virtually inviolable from 
early pre-Revolutionary years at least into the early decades of the na-
tion. These principles, representing the very core of the revolution-
ary-era and founding ideology, have been lost over the decades to an 
overbearing government guided by majorities that are allowed to im-
The lower lawmaking track is intended to register the successful conclusions of plu-
ralist democratic politics-the mix of interest group pressure, regular electioneering, 
and practical policymaking that characterizes the democratic polity most of the time. 
The higher lawmaking track, in contrast, is designed with revolutionaries in mind. 
It ... imposes a rigorous set of institutional tests before allowing a revolutionary 
movement to transform fundamental political principles .... [(\)] passage of time. 
Before a revolutionary change is adopted, it should have the sustained support of a 
substantial majority, not just support at a single moment. . .. [(2) P ]opular debate 
must be given full play before a final decision is reached. . .. [This is] more than a 
mechanical vote-count at a referendum. The higher lawmaking system is intended 
to determine whether a revolutionary initiative has gained the considered support of 
a self-conscious and deliberate majority. 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 14-15 (\992) (citing BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (\991». 
This description is well and good, to the extent it is used as the cogent description it is of how 
politics plays out under our constitutional scheme and results occasionally in a "revolutionary 
movement to transform political principles" in a policymaking sense. But the moment the the-
ory is extended to support a suggestion that there is some sort of "complex process of 'Publian 
politics' where 'we the people' become authorized to change the Constitution without ever 
invoking the procedures laid out in Article V," as suggested by Sanford Levinson on the dust 
jacket to Ackerman's book, we've gone beyond what is acceptable under our constitutional 
scheme. See Sanford Levinson, Review IN BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS (back cover dust-jacket) (1991). This theory is pulled out of thin air. It simply 
cannot be that anyone-We the People or otherwise-can change the Constitution without 
invoking Article V if we are truly committed to a system of constitutionalism. To suggest oth-
erwise opens up a Pandora's box of difficult questions about when, for example, we have 
reached sufficient passage of time and debate to justifY "changing" the Constitution. In terms 
of adherence to basic principles of constitutional fidelity, conceptually this approach is on a 
par with erstwhile Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork's statement that a particularly disfa-
vored provision of the Constitution (the Ninth Amendment) may be conveniently ignored as if 
obscured by "an ink-blot on the page." 
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pose their beliefs and morality on others. 
If the freedom of autonomy is to be revived from its current 
slumber in modem-day America, Americans must develop a greater 
understanding of the nature and rich history of this most basic natural 
right. Greater awareness can lead to a shift in thinking away from the 
current status quo of government as paternalistic overseer, and back 
toward the original intent of government subservient to the individual. 
They may look again to the inspirational words of the Declaration, 
knowing that from the beginning, our forebears knew it would not be 
easy. When freedom was on the line, "the colonists knew ... [w ]hat 
would in fact happen [next] ... would be the result ... of the degree 
of vigilance and the strength of purpose the people could exert. For 
they believed ... [t]he preservation of liberty would continue to be 
what it had been in the past, a bitter struggle with adversity .... ,,204 
And so preservation of liberty continues to be what it has been in the 
past-a bitter struggle with adversity-and only time will tell whether 
modem-day Americans have what it takes to make the necessary 
changes to ensure its survival. 
204. BAIL YN, supra note 5 at 85. 
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